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ABSTRACT
S elf-stab ilizing  In te r-D o m a in  P olicy R o u tin g
by
Venkatakrishnan Trichy Ramasubramanian
Dr. Ajoy K. Datta, Examination Committee Chair 
School of Computer Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Dr. Sébastien Tixeuil, Examination Committee Co-Chair 
Professor of Computer Science 
Université de Paria-Sud, France
The global Internet is composed of many nntonomows sz/steTZZs. An autonomous system 
is a collection of hosts, gateways, networks and links managed by a single administrative 
authority. Rowtmg is the task of determining the best neighbor to which a data message 
should be forwarded towards a particular destination. Policy routmg refers to any form 
of routing that is inhuenced by factors other than merely picldng the shortest path. The 
quality of service and policy compatibility can all be expressed as a set of desired path 
attributes. Policy routing searches for a path that meets all the requested attributes. Enter 
Doznoin Policy Pouting (ID P R ) is used to construct and maintain routes between diEerent 
autonomous systems. These routes provide user tra&c with the services requested within 
the constraints stipulated for the autonomous systems transited.
As the complexity of the networked systems increases, the likelihood of experiencing 
unanticipated faults grows. Pclf-siolzilization is the most general technique to design fault 
tolerant systems. This paradigm was introduced by Dijkstra in 1974. A  sel/^sto6iliziny
iii
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system guEirantees that starting from an arbitrary state, the system converges to a legal 
state in a hnite number of steps and remains in a legal state until another fault occurs. 
Such a system after any unexpected perturbation eventually recovers without any outside 
intervention.
The goal of this thesis research is to design a self-stabilizing Inter Domain Policy Rout­
ing Algorithm in order to make the policy routing procedure resistant to failures. We 
propose two algorithms. Our first algorithm sets up a path &om a source to a destination, 
where the source and destination belong to diEerent autonomous systems. It  uses the Path 
Control Protocol (PC P). This algorithm can handle path failures, but cannot cope w ith  
message losses. Our second solution takes care of this problem by using the Control Mes­
sage Transport Protocol (C M TP ). Formal proof of correctness for both solutions wiU be 
given.
I V
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C HA PTER 1 
IN TR O D U C TIO N
The Internet has evolved from a single homogeneous environment into the infrastructure 
that consists of a multivendor collection of diverse network technologies. I t  is a massive 
internetwork of router-connected networks, consisting of thousands of autonomous systems 
that are managed by diEerent authoritiœ. These networks share traG c and exchange routing 
information.
The commercialization of Internet has initiated the need of policy based routing. In  to­
day's high performance internetworks, organizations need the freedom to implement packet 
forwarding and routing according to their own deEned policies in a way that goes beyond 
traditional routing protocol concerns. In  cases where administrative issues dictate that 
traSc be routed through specihc paths, pohcy-based routing can provide the solution. By 
using policy-based routing, customers can implement policies that selectively cause packets 
to take diEerent paths [1]. Policy routing also provides a mechanism to mark packets so that 
certain types of traSc receive preferential service. Inter-Dom ain Policy Routing (ID P R ) is 
used to construct and maintain pohcy routes among autonomous systems. It  ensures that 
the trafhc is forwarded along routes that oEer the requested services without violating the 
restrictions of intermediate autonomous systems.
Various types of faults can occur in inter domain routing. Messages may get lost or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
corrupted. The memory variables can get corrupted. Thus, routing among autonomous 
systems must be fault- tolerant. The paradigm of self-stabilization introduced by D ijkstra  
[18] is the most uniEed approach to design fault-tolerant systems.
1.1 Our Contributions
In  this thesis, we will study the appEcation of self-stabihzation in designing the Inter 
Domain Pohcy Routing algorithm. We solve the problem of setting up a path from a source 
to a destination, where source and destination belong to diEerent autonomous systems. The 
path satisEes the requested services while respecting the transit policies of the intermediate 
autonomous systems.
Our solution is seE-stabilizing. It  handles many types of faults, including message losses 
and variable corruptions. We send data after conforming the successful estabhshment of 
the path. Our solution can also handle path failures. We present two algorithms. The Erst 
algorithm sets up the path using the Path Control Protocol (PC P). The second algorithm  
deals with message losses using the Control Message Transport Protocol (C M T P ).
1.2 Thesis Outhne
In  chapter 2, we give an overview of some of the areas involved in this research, such 
as routing, Internet, and seE-stabhization. In  Chapter 3, the functions, elements, pohcies 
of ID P R  are brieEy explained. We present 2 algorithms for self-stabihzing Inter-Domain 
Pohcy Routing, foUowed by its proof of correctness in Chapter 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND CONCEPTS  
In  this chapter, we explain some terms used in routing, Internet, and self-stabilization. In  
Section 2.1, we discuss routing in the Internet, and in Section 2.2, we deSne the Autonomous 
System. A brief discussion of policy routing is included in Section 2.3. A brief overview of 
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is presented in Section 2.4. In  Section 2.5, we give a short 
introduction to self-stabilization.
2.1 Routing in the Internet 
The Internet is not "one network", there is no such thing as one huge international com­
pany that would provide connections to users in various continents. Instead, the Internet 
is a loose interconnection of networks belonging to many owners. One usually distinguishes 
three levels of networks: organizational, regional, and transit. The com parût and institu­
tions attached to the Internet generally manage an internal network. Its complexity can 
vary with the size of the organization. Most organization's networks are connected to the In ­
ternet through a "regional" provider which manages a set of links covering a state, a region, 
or a small countiy. These regional networks provide connectivity to their customers. They 
also render a number of related services such as helping users to manage their networks, 
getting Internet addresses, and providing mail-boxes for isolated users. Being connected to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
other Internet users in the same city, even in the same state, is not quite suEicient. The 
purpose o f Internet is worldwide connectedness. This connectivity may be provided by a 
"transit" provider [29].
Every packet has a source and a destination, and routing is the mechanism which de­
termines the path a packet should take in order to reach the speciEed destination. Routing 
on the Internet can be classiEed into two areas: local routing and wide-area routing [23]. 
Local routing transports a packet to a host within a particular network once it has reached 
that network. Wide-area routing deals with transporting a packet between networks, i.e., 
across the Internet itseE.
W ith in  any host, there w ill be a routing table that the host uses to determine the 
physical interface address to use for the outgoing packets. E  a computer receives a packet 
on any interface, there are two possibihties. The packet is intended for the computer. Then 
the packet w ill be passed to the relevant appUcation. Otherwise, the packet is addressed 
to some other computer. We re-transmit on one of the available interfaces towards that 
computer.
Internet routing instabihty, or the rapid Euctuation of network reachability information, 
is an important problem currently facing the Internet engineering community. High levels of 
network instability can lead to packet loss, increased network latency and time to converge. 
A t the extreme, high levels of routing instabihty have led to the loss of internal connectivity 
in wide-area, national networks [12].
Administrative policies, performance requirements, load balancing, and scalabihty are 
becoming increasingly signiEcant factors in Internet routing. Intelhgent path selection based 
on multiple constraints or packet content takes these factors into consideration. Constralnt-
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based routing (CBR) denotes a class of routing algorithms that base path selection decisions 
on a set of requirements or constraints in addition to the destination. These constraints 
may be imposed by administrative policies or by Quality of Service (QoS) requirements. 
Constraints imposed by policies are referred to as policy constraints, and the associated 
routing is referred to as policy routing (or policy-based routing). Constraints imposed by 
QoS requirements, such as bandwidth, delay, or loss are referred to as QoS constraints, and 
the associated routing is referred to as QoS' routing [40].
2.2 Autonomous System 
An Autonomous S'ystezn (AS) is a collection of hosts, gateways, networks, and hnks 
managed by a single administrative authority. The domain administrator dehnes service 
restrictions for transit trafSc, and service requirements for locally-generated traKc. It  also 
selects the addressing schemes and routing procedures that apply within the domain. The 
minimal AS is composed of exactly one router directly connecting one local network to 
the Internet, but there is no theoretical hmit to the size of an AS. We will use the terms 
"autonomous systems" and "administrative domains" interchangeably in this report.
2.3 Policy Routing
In  its broadest sense, policy routing refers to any form of routing that is inEuenced 
by factors other than merely picking the shortest path [29]. Policy routing is used to 
accommodate "acceptable-use policies", to select providers and to End paths that provide 
a particular quality of service. For example, commercial users do not want to send packets 
through academic backbones They have to route packets through a network that accepts 
commercial tra&c. They can sp ec if the Est of providers to be used so that it meets the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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throughput or delay requirements. The quahty of service considerations such as Ending 
a path that would be adequate for high-bandwidth can also be included. The quality of 
service and pohcy compatibihty can all be expressed as a set of desired path attributes.
2.3.1 Pohcy Route Generation 
D istance V ec to r A pproach: This type of routing protocol requires that each router in­
form its neighbors of its routing table. For each network path, the receiving routers 
pick the neighbor advertising the lowest cost, then add this entiy^ into its routing table 
for re-advertisement [2]. Distance vector route generation distributes the computa­
tion of a single route among multiple routing entities along the route. Hence, distance 
vector route generation is potentially susceptible to routing loop formation and slow 
adaptation to changes in an internetwork.
L in k  S ta te  A pproach: This type of routing protocol requires each router to maintain 
at least a partial map of the network. When a network hnk changes its state (up 
to down, or vice versa), a notiEcation, cahed a liuA state aduertisemeut (LSA) is 
Eooded throughout the network. A ll the routers note the change, and recompute 
their routes accordingly. This method is more reliable, easier to debug, and less 
bandwidth-intensive than distance vector [2]. Link state route generation permits 
concentration of the computation of a single route within a single routing entity at 
the source of the route.
2.3.2 Message Forwarding 
H op-by-H op  A pproach: In hop-by-hop message forwarding, each routing entity makes 
an independent forwarding decision based on a message's source, destination, and the 
entity's forwarding information database.
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Source SpeciEed Approach: In  source speciEed message forwarding, the source domain 
dictates the data message forwarding decisions to the routing entities in each inter­
mediate domain. Those entities then forward data messages according to the source 
speciEcation.
2.4 Border Gateway Protocol 
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an inter-autonomous system routing protocol 
[33]. BGP exchanges network reachabüity information with other BGP speakers. The 
information for a network includes the complete list of autonomous systems that the traSic 
must transit to reach that network. This information can then be used to ensine loop-hee 
paths. This information is sufEcient to construct a graph of AS connectivity from which 
routing loops may be pruned and some pohcy decisions at the AS level may be enforced.
BGP uses path vector routing and hop-by-hop message forwarding. BGP (Border Gate­
way Protocol) is a protocol for exchanging routing information between gateway hosts (each 
with its own router) in a network of autonomous s '̂stems. BGP is often the protocol used 
between gateway hosts on the Internet. The routing table contains a list of known routers, 
the addresses they can reach, and a cost metric associated with the path to each router so 
that the best a^mlable route is chosen.
To characterize the set of pohcy decisions that can be enforced using BGP, one must 
focus on the rule that an autonomous system advertises to its neighboring autonomous only 
those routes that it itseh uses. This rule reEects the hop-by-hop routing paradigm generally 
used throughout the current Internet. Note that some pohcies cannot be supported by 
the hop-by-hop routing paradigm, and thus require techniques such as source routing to 
enforce. For example, BGP does not enable one autonomous system to send traSc to a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
neighboring autonomous system intending that tra& c take a diEerent route from that taken 
b)r the traË c originating in the neighboring autonomous s^'stem. On the other hand. BGP  
can support any policy conforming to the hop-by-hop routing paradigm [33j.
2.5 Self-stabilization
The notion of was introduced by Dijkstra in 1973. He deEned a sys­
tem as seE-stabEizing when "regardless of its in itial state, it is guaranteed to arrive at a 
legitimate state in a Enite number of steps" [17]. Lamport later appreciated and explained 
it.
A self-stabihzing system S' guarantees that, starting Eom an arbitrary global state, it 
reaches a legal global state within a Enite number of state transitions, and remains in a legeil 
state unless a change occurs. In  a non-self-stabilizing system, the system designer needs to 
enumerate the accepted kinds of faults, such as node/hnk failures, and he must add special 
mechanisms for recovery. Generally, not ah types of faults are taken in consideration, and 
an obscure error such as a memory corruption can provoke a general reset of the entire 
system. Ideally, a system should continue its work by correctly restoring the system state 
whenever a fault occurs [6, 25].
SeE-stabhization was deEned in terms of closure and convergence in [5, 6]. Closure refers 
to the property which requires that during all system executions, the system stays w ithin 
some set of legal or desirable set of states unless a fault occurs. Convergence requires the 
system to reach a legal state Eom any arbitrary (possibly hlegal) state in Enite steps. A  
system is self-stabilizing E it satisEes both closure and convergence properties.
In  [5, 6], a comprehensive study of diEerent types of faults (such as crash, stuck-at, 
fail-stop, omission, timing, performance and Byzantine) and how they are accommodated
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in their dehnition of stabilization (in terms of closure and convergence) was included. The 
first formal dehnition of fault-tolerance was given in [6]. The results hke |5, 6] and some 
others (refer [28]) in subsequent years establish the fact that self-stabilization is the meet 
unihed strategy of achieving fault-tolerance in distributed systems.
Numerous models have been considered in the literature. There exist several dimen­
sions of the model, such as execution model (shared registers and message passing), fair­
ness (weakly fair, strongly fair, and unfeur), granularity of the atomic step (composite vs. 
read/w rite atomicity), and types of daemons (central and distributed). Stabilization time 
complexity and space complexity have been two important factors in this topic. Stabilizing 
a program is quite challenging. Two techniques have been commonly used in the literature: 
convergence stair [26] and variant function [30] methods.
Many general methods of designing self-stabihzing programs have been proposed. We 
mention some of them here without any description: diEusing computation [7], silent sta- 
bihzation |21], local stabihzer [4], local checking and local correction [8, 38], distributed 
program checking [9], counter Eushing [39], window washing [14], seE-containment [24], 
snap-stabihzation [15], super-stabEization [22], power supply [3], and transient fault detec­
tor [10]. A brief survey of self-* systems is given in [41].
SeE-stabilization has been extensively used in the area of network protocols. Numerous 
papers have been written on protocols like routing (including cut-through, wormhole), al­
ternating bit, sliding window, session control, congestion control, connection management, 
high-speed networks, sensor networks, and max-Eow computation. Refer to [20, 28] for 
the pointers. Alany of these protocols also consider message losses and duphcations, and 
node/link failures.
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CHAPTER 3
IN T E R -D O M A IN  P O LIC Y  RO UTING  
Inter Domain routing refers to routing among Autonomous Systems. The objective of ID P R  
is to construct and maintain routes between a source and a destination autonomous system. 
The route should provide user trafhc w ith the services requested within the constraints 
stipulated for the autonomous systems transited.
In  this chapter, we discuss some concepts associated with Inter-Domain Policy Routing 
(ID P R ). In  section 3.1, we describe the type of pohcies. Section 3.2 brieEy explains the 
routing and message forwarding techniques used. A list of the functions performed by 
ID P R  is presented in Section 3.3. In  Section 3.4, we give a short introduction to the 
elements in ID P R  architecture. The protocols and procedures present in ID P R  are given 
in Section 3.5. Finally in Section 3.6, we describe how ID P R  approaches pohcy routing in 
the Internet.
3.1 Pohcies
T ra n s it P o licy: W ith  pohcy routing, each autonomous system administrator sets
policies that dictate how and by whom the resources vdthin its autonomous system 
should be used. Transit pohcies are usually pubhc, and they specify oEered services.
Source Policy: Each autonomous system administrator also sets .source policies for tra&c
10
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originating from its autonomous system. Source policies are usually private, and they 
sp ec if requested services.
3.2 Routing and Message Forwarding 
Source Specîûed M essage Forw ard ing: W ith  source speciEed message forwarding, the 
source autonomous system dictates the data message forwarding decisions to the rout­
ing entities in each intermediate autonomous system, which then forward data mes­
sages according to the source speciEcation. Thus, the source autonomous system 
ensures that any data message originating from it follows its selected routes. For 
source speciEed message forwarding, each data message must carry either an entire 
source speciEed route or a path identiEer.
L in k  S ta te  R a n tin g : In  link state routing, ah nodes have a copy of the network map, 
which is regularly updated. W ith  link state routing information distribution, all recip­
ients of a autonomous system's hnk state message gain knowledge of that autonomous 
system's transit policies, and hence service restrictions. Thus, an autonomous system 
has complete control over service restrictions and restricting distribution of its routing 
information.
3.3 Functions
Inter-domain pohcy routing is comprised of the following functions:
1. Cohecting and distributing routing information including autonomous system transit 
pohcies and inter-domain connectivity.
2. Generating and selecting policy routes based on the routing information distributed 
and on the source pohcies conEgured or requested.
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3. Setting np paths across the internet using the policy routes generated.
4. Forwarding messages across and between autonomous systems along the established 
paths.
5. Maintaining databases of routing information, inter-domain policy routes, and for­
warding and conhguration information.
3.4 Elements
From the perspective of ID P R , the Internet consists of autonomous systems connected 
by virtual gateways which are in turn connected by intra-domain routes supporting the 
transit policies conEgured by the autonomous system administrators.
V ir tu a l G atew ays: They are the only connecting points recognized by ID P R  between 
adjacent autonomous systems. Each virtual gateway is actually a collection of directly 
connected policy yolewoys in two adjacent autonomous systems whose existence has 
been sanctioned by the administrators of both autonomous systems.
P o licy G atew ays: The physical gateways w ithin a virtual gateway are pohcy gateways. 
Each policy gateway forwards transit traERc according to the service restrictions stip­
ulated by its autonomous system's transit pohcies applicable to its virtual gateway. 
W ithin a virtual gateway, two pohcy  ̂ gateways are peers if they are in the same au­
tonomous system, and are adyocenl if  they are in diEerent autonomous systems.
R o u te  Server: Each route seruer is responsible for its database of routing information, 
including autonomous system connectivity and transit pohcy information, and the 
database of policy routes. Each route server generates policy routes on behalf of its 
autonomous system. It  may be part of the functionality of the pohcy gateway.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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P ath  Agents: They act on behalf of hosts to select pohcy routes, to set up and manage 
paths, and to maintain forwarding information databases. It  may reside in the pohcy 
gateway.
M ap p in g  server: It  is responsible for the database of mappings that resolve Internet 
names and addresses to autonomous systems. The functions of the mapping server 
can be integrated into an existing name service such as the DNS.
C onSguration server: The database of conEgured information that applies to pohcy 
gateways, path agents, and route servers in the given autonomous system is main­
tained by a conEguration server. The functions of the conEguration server can be 
integrated into the autonomous system's existing network management system.
3.5 Protocols and Procedures
V irtu a l G atew ay P rotocol: Every pohcy gateway within an autonomous system partic­
ipates in gathering information about connectivity v ith in  and between virtual gate­
ways of which it is a member, and in distributing this information to other virtual 
gateways in its autonomous system. These functions are referred to as the Virtual 
Gatewaz/ Protocol (VG P). V irtual gateway connectivity information, distributed to 
pohcy gateways vdthin a single autonomous system, aids those pohcy gateways in 
selecting routes across and between virtual gateways connecting their autonomous 
system to adjacent autonomous systems.
F lood ing  Protocol: An autonomous system repTesemloliue policy gateway uses unrestricted 
Eooding among all autonomous systems to distribute its autonomous system's ID P R  
routing information messages to route servers in an internetwork. There are two kinds
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of ID P B  routing information messages issued by each autonomous system representa­
tive: CO NFIG URATIO N and DYNAAHC messages. Each C O N FIG U R A TIO N  mes­
sage contains the transit policy information conhgirred by the autonomous system 
administrator, including for each transit policy, its identiEer, speciEcation, and the 
sets of virtual gateways conEgured as mutually reachable via intra-domain routes sup­
porting the given transit policy. Each D ltN A M IC  message contains information about 
current virtual gateway connectivit}'̂  to adjacent autonomous systems, and the sets 
of virtual gateways currently mutually reachable via intra-domain routes supporting 
the conEgured transit pohcies.
R oute  Server Q uery P rotocol: Each route server is responsible for maintaining both 
the routing information database and the route database, and for responding to 
database information requests from pohcy gateways and other route servers. These 
requests and their responses are the messages exchanged via the Route Server Query 
Protocol (RSQP). Pohcy gateways and route servers normally invoke RSQP to replace 
absent, outdated, or corrupted information in their own routing information or route 
databases.
P a th  C ontro l P rotocol: Two entities in diEerent autonomous systems may exchange 
ID PR  data messages, only E  there exists an ID P R  path set up between the two 
autonomous systems. Path setup requires cooperation among path agents and inter­
mediate pohcy gateways. Path agents locate pohcy routes, initiate the Path Control 
Protocol (PGP), and manage existing paths between autonomous systems. Intermedi­
ate policy gateways veri^  that a given pohcy route is consistent w ith their autonomous 
systems' transit pohcies, estabhsh the forwarding information, and forward messages
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along existing paths. Messages exchanged by the path control protocol are classified 
into reguests; SETUP, TEARDO W N, REPAIR; and responses; ACCEPT, REFUSE, 
and ERROR.
R o u te  G en eration  Procedure: Route generation is the most computationally complex 
part of ID P R , due to the number of autonomous systems, and the number and het­
erogeneity of policies that it must accommodate. Route servers must generate policy 
routes that satisfy the requested services of the source autonomous systems, and re­
spect the oEered services of the transit autonomous systems.
D a ta  Message Forw ard ing Procedure: Once a path for a policy route is set up, its 
physical realization is a set of consecutive policy gateways, with policy gateways or 
route servers forming the endpoints. Two successive entities in this set belong to 
either the same autonomous system or the same virtual gateway. A pohcy gateway 
or route sert'̂ er may, at any time, recover the resources dedicated to a path that goes 
through it by tearing down that path. For example, a pohcy gateway may decide to 
tear down a path that has not been used for some period of time.
3.6 Approach
The task in the design of ID P R  consists of the fohowing: maintenance of a "network 
m ap", the computation of pohcy routes from this map, and the setup of paths through the 
interconnection of autonomous systems.
1. It  would be unrealistic to represent the whole Internet in a single hnk state database. 
The autonomous systems in the Internet provide aggregates for a high-level map, where 
the nodes would not be the routers but the autonomous systems themselves, and the hnks
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would be those huMug the autonomous systems.
2. ID P R  routes are computed on demand. A route request lists the source, the desti­
nation, the requested quahty-of-service, and monetary constraints. The source and transit 
policies are taken into account.
3. The path setup is the establishment of a virtual circuit. The path control messages 
are used to set up the path. The in itial setup request progresses hop-by-hop from a policy 
gateway to another policy gateway. Bach intermediate hop checks E the request is compat­
ible w ith the autonomous system's transit pohcies, and may re/uae the path ætablishment 
if  this is not the case. The path is assigned a path identiher. The path wih be established 
when the setup message reaches the target. An acceptance message wih travel towards the 
source, after which data can be sent bv the source.
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CHAPTER 4
SELF-STA B H IZIN G  H)PR  
In  this chapter, we present a self-stabilizing ID P R  algorithm. First, in Section 4.2, we 
discuss some of the fault-tolerant routing techniques used in Inter-Domain Routing. In  
Section 4.3 we describe the model, network topology, and the speciEcation of the problem. 
The Algorithm and its description are given in Section 4.4. In  Section 4.5, we present
the proof of correctness. The pseudo code of the algorithms are presented in Section 4.6.
4.1 Moti^'ation
As data communication technologies evolve and user populations grow, the demand 
for internetworking increases. Internetworks usually proliferate through interconnection 
of autonomous and heterogeneous networks administered by separate authorities. Inter­
connection of adnunistrative domains can broaden the range of services available in an 
internetwork. Hence, tra&c w ith special service requirements is more likely to receive the 
service requested. However, administrators of domains oEering special transit services are 
more likely to establish stringent access restrictions in order to maintain control over the 
use of their domains' resources. An internetwork composed of many domains with diverse 
service requirements and restrictions requires pohcy routing to transport tra@c between 
source and destination [34]. Policy routing constitutes route generation and message for-
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warding procedures for producing and using routes that simultaneously satisfy user service 
requirements and respect transit domain service restrictions. In  the large and heterogeneous 
Internet, the routing procedures must be capable of ensuring that tra&c is forwarded along 
routes that oSer the required services without violating domain usage restrictions. ID P R  
meets this goal. It  has been designed to accommodate an internet comprising a very large 
number of administrative domains w ith diverse service oSerings and requirements. The 
routing process is susceptible to faults. The faults result in incorrect deliver)'̂  of messages 
or loss of messages. The pohcy requirements and restrictions should also be taken into 
account. Self-stabihzation is the most general technique to design fault tolerant s^ntems.
4.2 Related Work
An architecture for Inter-Domain Policy Routing is specihed in [34]. The specihcation 
of the Inter Domain Policy Routing Protocol is given in [36]. I t  presents the set of protocols 
and procedures that constitute Inter-Dom ain Policy Routing (ID P R ). The key concepts and 
protocols developed as part of the Inter-Dom ain Pohcy Routing (ID P R ) architecture are 
summarized in [16]. I t  has placed particular emphasis on the route installation and packet 
forwarding mechanisms.
Network topology maintenance is an important component of Internet routing. A lot 
of research has been done in this area [25, 37, 29]. Nodes/hnks failures directly cause 
the network topology changes, which im phcitly introduce errors in routing. Since network 
topology maintenance protocol is the underlying protocol for most of the routing protocols, 
its stabihty is very important. The topology update problem has been discussed in [19, 22, 
27, 31].
A self-stabilizing routing scheme for general networks has been given in [11]. Border
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Gateway Protocol uses the path vector approach for distributing routing information and 
the hop by hop technique for data message forwarding. A description of self-stabilizing 
Border Gateway Protocol is specihed in [13]. I t  deals w ith the problem of rapid huctuation 
of the network reachability information. The overview of functionality and a discussion of 
the experiments with implementation of ID P R  is given in [35]. The routing information 
must be distributed in a reliable manner. The strategies for fault tolerant distribution of 
routing information are discussed in [32]. We propose a self-stabilizing ID P R  using the 
link state approach and source specihed message forwarding.
4.3 Model and Prehminaries
4.3.1 Model
N e tw o rk  Topology. Our network is a collection of autonomous systems. Each au­
tonomous system is a collection of networks, gateways and links managed by a single ad­
ministrative authority. I t  is represented as G (v,e), where v is the set of {host,pg, network} 
and e is the set of links, pg, a subset of v, is the pohcy gateway. V irtual gateway vg 
is a a collection of directly-connected "pohcy gateways" in two adjoining domains. It  is 
represented by: vg={pgi,pg2 , where pgz,pgy are directly connected and belong to
adjoining domains or the same domain.
Program . The state of a process is dehned by the value of its variables. The processes 
represent nodes or routers. The state of a sy'stem is a vector of n -F l components where the 
hrst n represent the state of n processes, and the last component refers to the set of messages 
in transit in the links. In  the fohowing, we refer to the state of a process and system as 
a (tocoZ) state and conjigamtion, respectively. Let a distributed protocol P  be a cohection
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of binary transition relations denoted by i-», on C, the set of all possible conhgnrations 
of the system. A computation of a protocol P  is a maximal sequence of configurations 
e — such that for t >  0 , i-» yt+i (a single computation step),
if yt+i exists, or % is a terminal conhguration. M oiim olitp means that the sequence is 
either inhnite, or it is hnite and no action of P  is enabled in the hnal conhguration. A ll 
computations considered in this thesis are assumed to be maximal.
During a computation step, one of the following actions (focal steps) occurs on at least 
one process p: (1) p receives a message; (2) p executes some internal actions; (3) p sends 
at least one message. The set of computations of a protocol P  in system S' starting w ith a 
particular configuration a  € C is denoted by 6 ^. The set of all possible computations of P  
in system S is denoted as S.
Bach action of a process is of the form:
<  lo6el > <  guard > — »
<  statement >
<  statement >
The guard of an action in the program of a process p is one of the following: a local guard 
of p or a receiving guard of p. A local guard of p is a boolean expression involving the 
variables of p. A  receiving guard of p is of the form:
rev <  message_tppe >  from <  sendtng_channeZ_name > . The statements of a process are 
of four types: assignment, sending, selection, and iteration. An assignment statement of p 
is of the form: Zp := Bp where Zp is a variable of p and Bp is a constant or expression of 
the same type as Zp. A sending statement of p is of the form: send <  messageJppe >  to
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<  rcceM;mg_chaTmel_fiame > .
A selection statement of p is of the form: i f  . . .  8 . An iteration statement of p is of the 
form: fo r . . .  endfor or do w hile  . . .  od.
The statement of an action of p updates one or more variables of p. When p executes 
a statement, we say that "p moves" or "p executes an action". An action can be executed 
only if its guard eAm,luates to true. We assume that the actions are atomically executed, 
meaning, the evaluation of a guard and the execution of the corresponding statement of an 
action, if executed, are done in one atomic step.
S elf-stab iliz in g  P rogram . Let B be a predicate (called, legitimacp predicate) dehned 
with respect to a specihcation (predicate) A. An algorithm A  is sey-stobilizing for the 
specihcation A  if (i) any computation of A  starting from a conhguration satisfying B satishes 
B  (correctness) and (ii) starting from any conhguration € C, any computation of A  reaches 
a conhguration which satishes (convergence) in hnite steps.
4.3.2 Problem Specihcation 
Our seiLstabilizing ID P R  algorithm ensures that every message is delivered from a source 
host in one autonomous system to a destination host in another autonomous system, using 
routes that provide user traSc with the services requested within the constraints stipulated 
for the domains transited.
S pecihcation 4.1 (In te r-D o m a in  P o licy  R o u tin g ) Glueu a wcll-cons^r'ucW message 
A4 /m m  a source node iu an autonomous sgstem, an execution o/ tAe sgstem satis/ies 
the fnter-Domatn Policg Routing Pm 6tem (we unit call it i /  the /ollowing pmpertg
holds."
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R e lia b le  D e liv e ry : The message A4 yfom 5  w ill he sa/el^ delhwred at its destination in 
onother autonomous sgstem, using mutes that pmuide user tmj^c with the services 
reguested within the constraints stipulated /o r the domains trarisited.
This property ensures correct behavior of the algorithm. We also require our algorithm to 
be se lf-s tab iliz in g  as per the definition given in the previous Section.
4.4 Inter Domain Policy Routing Algorithm  
In  this section, we formally present the self-stabilizing ID P R  algorithm, called TDPR,. 
First, we discuss the data structures (Section 4.4.1). Next, we give an informal description 
of the algorithm in Section 4.4.2.
4.4.1 Data Structures 
C onstants: The constants are shown in Algorithm 4.1. The constants are inputs to Algo­
rithm  They are maintained by the virtual gateway protocol [36].
Messages: The messages are shown in Algorithm 4.2.
1. Establishes a path by linking pairs of policy gateways.
2 . A C C B B T : Signals successful path establishment.
3. R B B D B B : Signals that the path could not be successfully established. Contains 
identiher of the path and the reason for refusal.
4. B R R O R : Signals path error because of duphcate or unrecognized parameters in 
path setup messages. Contains identifier of the path and the reason for error.
5. T B A R D O IW : Tears down a path.
6 . ACFf: Acknowledgment for data.
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7. RBB A7R: Establishes a repaired path linking pairs of policy gateways.
8 . D A TA : The D A T A  message has two formats, one for the message from host to 
the policy gateway and one that is sent between pohcy gateways. The D A TA  
message hom host has the user data, source, destination, requested services and 
domains to be excluded. The ezclude set contmns the domains to be excluded. 
The D A T A  message from pohcy gateway has the path id in addition to these 
parameters.
Variables: The mufmg table of each pohcy gateway consists of six arrays as shown in 
Algorithm 4.3. Array contains the existing routes. Array ezist_pothJd
represents the path id corresponding to the routes. The arrays ezist.g)ath_preupg and 
ez2st_potA_neztpg denote the previous and next pohcy gateways, respectively, on the 
path. Array ezist_path_timestamp stores the times the paths were setup. The array 
ezist.gxzth_jaccept denotes if the path has been accepted (path setup was successful). 
The variable b u //e r  is used to hold the messages.
Procedures: The procedures used in the solution are shown in Algorithm 4.3. SELECT- 
NEXTPG selects a reachable neztpg that satisfies domain conditions. SETUPCHECKS 
checks if the S B T D T  message received contains valid information. ROUTEGEN com­
putes a route following the source routing scheme. This route must satisf}" the re­
quested services and respect the transit policies. SELECTREPAIRPG selects an alter­
nate neztpg that satishes certain reachability conditions.
4.4.2 Informal Description 
Algorithm T D P R  consists of two meiin protocols: TC P and CA4TP. As the protocol 
TC P is very long, to help understand the algorithm, we give an abstract and a full version
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of our solution in Sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3. respectively. The CAdTT protocol is presented 
in Section 4.6.4.
We will take the following approach in describing Algorithm PCT. We w ill try  to explain 
all the functionalities referring to the abstract version only. However, in some cases, we refer 
to some amiables and parameters which are missing in the abstract version of the code. In  
those casæ, we w ill refer to the full version of the algorithm.
In  this section, we briehy explain the behavior of our algorithm in hnding a path which 
satishes the policy restrictions for the data from source to destination. The main algo­
rithm  is presented as three sets of actions: receive, send, and error correction actions. In  
Section 4.4.2.1, we explain the process followed to route a data from a source to a desti­
nation assuming that the routing tables are correct and no faults occur during the data 
transmission. Then in Section 4.4.2.2, we explain how faults are detected and recovered. 
In  Section 4.4.2.S we w ill present Algorithm C A 4TP to handle message loss and message 
corruption.
4.4.2.1 Normal Behavior
First we describe the overall operation in which the data travels from source to desti­
nation. Later, we describe each of the steps in detail with reference to Algorithm PCP.
The policy gateway receives a D A T  A  from the host and generates a policy route. The 
mute is the set of autonomous systems to be traversed to reach the destination. This list 
of autonomous systems is used to choose a list of policy gateways forming a path. The 
policy gateway checks if a path for that route already exists in the routing table. I f  it 
exists, it sends the data in a D A T A  message via this path, and waits for an acknowledg­
ment. Otherwise, the policy gateway has to set up a path. The policy gateway selects a
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policy gateway in the next intermediate antonomons system and sends the S B TL 'P  mes­
sage to that policy gateway. The R B T D f message contains the route, requested services, 
constituent autonomous systems, and relevant transit policies. Using this information, an 
intermediate polic)  ̂gateway determines whether to accept or refuse the path, and to which 
next policy gateway to forward the R B T U P  message. The next and previous hop values 
are set in the routing table. The R B TU P  message is propagated along the policy gateways 
until it reaches the destination. Then the policy gateway in the destination autonomous 
system sends an A C C E P T  message, and the A C C E P T  message travels towards the source. 
Upon receiving the A C C E P T , the source sends D A T  A  towards the destination using the 
next hop information in the routing table. Upon receiving the data, the destination sends 
an acknowledgment message A C E  towards the source.
R oute G eneration: On receiving the data from the host. Action P i is executed. The 
ROUTEGEN procedure is called to generate the route. A breath hrst traversal of the 
autonomous systems is performed to reach the destination. During the traversal, the 
transit policies of the autonomous system are checked if  they match the requested 
ser\ices and do not belong to the ezclude set (intermediate autonomous systems to 
be excluded). These checks are performed in Lines 22.21 - 22.24 in Algorithm 4.23 
and then added to the route array in the order of the traversal.
I f  there already exists a path for this route, data can be sent (Line 4.03 - 4.04 in 
Algorithm 4.4). We can go directly to the step Send Data, followed by the step 
Acknowledgment. I f  no path exists, a path is setup using the two steps —  Path Setup 
and Path Accept —  as described below.
P ath  Setup: A next policy gateway (neztpo) is selected by calling the SELECTNEXTPG
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procedure (Line 4.07 in Algorithm 4.4). The SELECTNEXTPG selects the next policy 
gateway on a path in round-rohin order from its list of pohcy gateways contained in the 
present or next virtual gateway. W hile selecting the next policv" gateway, the pohcy 
gateway uses the information contained in the R E rU E  message, and information 
provided by the virtual gateway protocol and the intra-domain routing procedure. 
The R E T E E  message is forwarded to the pohcy gateway by executing Action 5 i. The 
next pohcy gateway receives the SETUP by executing Action Pg. I t  then performs 
some checks by calling the procedure SETUPCHECKS. The SETUPCHECKS procedure 
in Algorithm 4.22 checks for a duplicate message, checks if the current domain appears 
in the mœsages, and for the correct transit pohcies. It  returns true if  the checks fail, or 
false otherwise. I f  the checks do not fah, a next pohcy gateway (neztpg) is selected to 
forward the R E T E E  message (Lines 4.12 - 4.18 in Algorithm 4.4). The routing table 
(ezist_path array) values are set accordingly. (Lines 10.13 - 10.18 in Algorithm 4.10).
P a th  A ccept: By executing Action P 2 , the R E T E E  message is propagated until the 
destination is reached, since Line 4.17 in Algorithm 4.4 enables Action ,$1 of Algorithm  
4.8. When the R E T E E  message reaches the destination, it responds by sending an 
A C C E E T  message. On receiving the A C C E E T  message (Action P 3), the pohcy 
gateway checks if it is the source. I f  it is a source, it sends the data. I f  it is not, 
it forwards the A C C E E T  message. It  uses the values to forward
the A C C E E T  message following the reverse path of the S E T E E  message. The 
A C C E E T  message eventually reaches the source.
Send D ata : When the A C C E E T  message reaches the source, it indicates the correct 
establishment of the path. Now the source starts sending the D A T A  message. (Line
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4.24 in Algorithm 4.4). Action Pg is enabled and the policy gateway receives the 
D A T A . The path is checked for expiration and policy restrictions. Since the routing 
tables are correct, D A T A  is sent to the next policy gateway (ezigt_path_neztpg) on 
its path towards the destination (Line 6.27 in Algorithm 4.6).
A cknow ledgm ent: The A C P  is sent when the data reachæ the destination (Line 6.13 
in Algorithm 4.6), and is forwarded by the intermediate policy gateways. The A C P  
travels in the opposite direction of the data using the ezist_poth_preupg values (Line
7.17 in Algorithm 4.7).
4.4.2.2 Faults and Recovery
1. E rro rs  w h ile  sending th e  R E T E E  message:
On receiving the S E T E E  message by executing Action Pg, the policy gateway calls 
the procedure SETUPCHECKS (Algorithm 4.22) to perform some checks.
(a) I f  the pathJd in the S E T E E  message matches a stored id then it is a duplicate
message. The policy gateway discards the message.
(b) I f  the current domain does not appear in the 5 E T E E  message, E P P O E  message 
with reason as no_domam is sent to the previous policy gateway (Lines 21.06 - 
21.11). By executing Action P 5 , an E P P O P  message is propagated towards the 
source. The source sends a T E A P D D W A  message. By executing Action P? 
the resources are released (the routing table entries are removed). A  new route 
is generated by executing Action P 5 and a path is setup.
(c) I f  the adjacent virtual gateway is not reachable, a P E E E R E  message w ith
reaaon as no_reoch is sent to the preAous policy gateway (Lines 21.12 - 21.21).
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The previous pohcy gateway executes Action P 4 and selects an alternate next 
policy  ̂ gateway to forward the S E T E E  message. I f  there are no alternate pol­
icy gateways, the previous pohcy gateway sends a E E E E R E  message w ith  
reason as no^g towards the source which releases the resources hy sending a 
T E A E D O IW  message (Action P 7). By performing Action P 5 , a new route is 
generated and a path is setup.
(d) I f  the transit pohcies in the R E E E E  message do not match that of the cur­
rent autonomous system, a E E E E R E  message with reason as noTp is sent to 
the previous pohcy gateway. By executing Action P 4 , the previous pohcy gate­
way selects an alternate next pohcy gateway, to forward the R E T E E  message. 
I f  there are no alternate pohcy gateways, the previous pohcy gateway sends a 
E E E E  RE with reason as no_pg towards the source which releases the resources 
by sending a T E A E D O IT N  message.
2. E rro rs  w h ile  sending th e  D A T A  message:
The policy gateway receives D A T A  by executing Action Pg. The following checks 
are performed to detect the faults.
(a) I f  the next pohcy gateway is not reachable, it selects an alternate next pohcy 
gateway (neztpg) using the procedure SELECTREPAIRPG and sends a P E E A 7 E  
message to the next policy gateway (Line 6.22 in Algorithm 4.6). Procedure SE­
LECTREPAIRPG is given as Algorithm 4.21. I t  tries to select one of the fohowing 
if  it exists: a peer to neztpg directly connected to the current polic}'̂  gateway, 
a peer to neztpg which is connected to the peer of the current pohcy gate­
way, a peer to the current pohcy gateway and directly connected to neztpg. ( If
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there is no alternate policy gateway, it sends a TE A P D O IV A '' message towards 
the originator which releases the r^onrces). On recieAong the P E E A fP  mes­
sage (Action Pg), the pohcy gateway performs the setup checks using procedure 
R E T E E C P E C P R  and if there are no errors, selects the next pohcy gateway 
to forward the P E E A 7 P  message which again forwards until the destination is 
reached (Lines T.22 - 7.26 in Algorithm 4.7). The destination sends an A C C E E T  
towards the source (Lines 7.29 - 7.31 in Algorithm 4.7). The source can then 
send the D A T A  message.
(b) I f  the transit pohcies of the autonomous system do not allow trahie to how 
through, then a E E E E R E  w ith reason, as no^g message is sent (Lines 6.08 -
6.10 in Algorithm 4.6). By performing Action P 4 , the P E E E R E  message reaches 
the source. The source tears down the path using a TEAPDOB'^Af message and 
then sends a new route request and path setup (Lines 5.14 - 5.23 in Algorithm  
4.5). D A T A  can then be sent as in the above case.
(c) I f  the current pohcy gateway camiot recognize the path id, then an E P P C P  
message w ith reason as no_pathid is sent to the previous pohcy gateway. The 
previous pohcy gateway executes Action Pg to receive the message. It  then 
selects a next pohcy gateway using the procedure SELECTREPAIRPG and sends a 
P E E A 7 P  message to the next policy gateway. The path is repaired by executing 
Action Pg.
(d) I f  the current autonomous system is a member of the ezcZude set, then an 
E P P C P  w ith reason as no_domaw is sent to the premous pohcy gateway (Line
6.06 in Algorithm 4.6). By performing Action Pg the message is sent towards
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the source which then generates a new route and sets up the path for sending 
D A TA .
3. Timeout Actions
AMien the path life time is up, i.e, the path expires, the path is torn down (Action 
R i). The T E A P D C W N  message is sent to release the resource (Algorithm 4.8).
4.4.2.3 Control Message Transport protocol
Errors in ID P R  messages can have bad effects on routing. So ID P R  protocols have been 
designed to minimize loss and corruption of control messages. Moreover, the ID P R  recipient 
of a control message hrst verifies that the message is well-formed. There are three types of 
CA4TE messages:
1. D A TA G R A M : Contains ID P R  control messages.
2. A C E C M T E : Positive acknowledgment in response to a D A T A G R A M  message.
3. A A R : Negative acknowledgment in response to a D A T A G R .4M  message.
The CA4TE operates in the following way.
Message Transm ission The ID P R  protocol, like PCP, passes a copy of the message and 
maximum number of transmissions allotted to CA4TE. Using the control message and 
parameters supplied, CA4TE constructs a D A T A G R A M . A transaction identiher is 
assigned to associate either an A G R G M T E  or a A A R . The protocol also calculates 
the length, saves a copy, sets a retransmission timer and sends the D A T A G R A M . It  
expects to receive either A G R G A fT E  or A A R  as a response (Lines 24.01 - 24.09 in 
Algorithm 4.26).
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D A T A G R A M  R eception The pohcy gateway receives the D A T A G R A M  by executing 
Action R ii-  I t  performs the C M TP vahdation checks on the D A T A G R A M . If  
the D A T A G R A M  passes the checks, the recipient dehvers the message to ID P R  
protocol, and sends back an A G R G M T R . I f  it fails to pass any of the checks, CA4TE  
returns A A R  to the sender and discards the D A T A G R A M  (Lines 27.10 - 27.21 in 
Algorithm 4.26). The corresponding send actions are in Algorithm 4.27.
A C K C M T P  R eception Upon receiving A G R G M T R  by performing Action R-ig, the 
pohcy gateway clears the retransmission timer, discards the D A T A G R A M  and sends 
an acknowledgment to the protocol, (see Lines 24.22 - 24.29 in Algorithm 4.26).
N A K  R eception  A'̂ AR is received by executing Action R ig. The pohcy gateway hrst 
checks if the number of transmissions of the D A T A G R A M  has exceeded the maxi­
mum number of transmissions. I f  the number is exceeded, then the D A T  A G R A M  is 
discarded. Otherwise it is retransmitted (Lines 24.30 - 24.44 in Algorithm 4.26).
T IM E O U T  I f  the retransmission timer times out before receiving either A G R G M T R  
or A A R , then the D A TA G R A A f is retransmitted, provided it has not exceeded 
the transmission allotment. Otherwise it is discarded (Action ^ ) .  Then the pohcy 
gateway informs the ID P R  protocol, which may resubmit the control message back to 
the CA4TR (Lines 25.14 - 25.16 in Algorithm 4.27).
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4.5 Proof of Correctness 
In  this section, we wiU prove the correctness of the algorithm presented in Section 4.4 
and show that it satishes the specihcations as dehned in Section 4.3.2. We hrst dehne the 
legitimacy predicate. Then we prove the reliable delivery property in Section 4.5.1 and the 
convergence property in Section 4.5.2.
The legitimacy predicate is dehned as follows:
=  The routing tables are correct.
Reliable delivery is implemented by maintaining correct routing tables. The conditions 
for the correctness of the routing table are given below.
C o rrect R o u tin g  Tables: The routing table is correct when the following properties 
hold.
(P I) The entries should have valid pothJds.
(P2) The entry ezist_palh_nezfpg should not belong to any autonomous system which 
is part of the set ezclude.
(P3) The entries ezigt_poth_neztpg and ezist_path_preupg have intra-domain connec­
tivity" or \drtual gateway reachability w ith the current pohcy gateway.
(P4) The ezW_path_accept hags are true only if the A G G E R T message corresponding 
to the E E R E R  message w ith the same pathJd has been received.
(P5) The entry is such that its transit pohcies allow trahie to how
in accordance with the requested services.
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4.5.1 Reliable Delivery 
We w ill prove that if the system is in a legitimate conhguration, the algorithm behaves 
correctly. We have assumed that no new faults occur, hence the error actions w ill not be 
invoked.
Lem m a 4.1 (R e liab le  D e liv e ry ) ,9tarfmg /m m  a t/mt satishes flic legiti-
mocy predicate, data w ill be sa/elp delluerW at Its destmotlon using routes thot proulde user 
tra ^ c  with the sendees r̂ eguested within the coTistmlnts stipulated /o r the domains transited.
P ro o f. Upon receiving the D A T A  from a host, a policy gateway 1 calls the
R G E T E G E A  procedure which returns the route. We need to consider two cases.
E x is tin g  P ath : I f  the route is an existing one, there exists a path. The policy gate­
way 1 delivers the D A T A  if it is the destination. I f  1 is not the destination then 
it has to forward the D A T A  by executing Action (Algorithm 4.6). Since the 
ezlst_palh_nezfpg is "̂alid as long as the predicate is true, the entries have
proper connectivity and satis^ the transit pohcy and requested services. It  checks 
the hag ezlst_path_accept, and since it is correct from the assumption, D A T  A  is for­
warded to the next pohcy gateway (ezlst_path_neztpg). Thus, D A T A  is forwarded 
correctly until it reaches the destination where it is delivered to the local host (Line
6.12 in Algorithm 4.6).
N e w  P ath : A  new path must be setup. A  S E T E E  message w ith the path id is sent to 
the next pohcy gateway ezlst_path_neztpg by executing Action R%. The .S E TE E  
message is forwarded by using Action Ra until the message reaches the destination. 
Then the destination sends back an A G G E E T  message(Line 4.20 in Algorithm 4.4).
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The policy gateway forwards A G G E E T  by executing Action Rg until it  reaches the 
source. As the ezlst_path_preupg entries are valid, the A G G E E T  message is sent 
correctly to the source. The source, upon receiving the A G G E E E , sends D A T A  by 
performing Action R 3 (Line 4.24 in Algorithm 4.4) which is forwarded as described 
in the previous case.
4.5.2 Convergence
First we prove that starting from an arbitrary conhguration, the route legitimacy predi­
cate w ill be satished in hnite time. In  order to prove the convergence we consider two cases. 
First we assume that there is no message loss or corruption. Then we assume that there 
are message losses or message corruption. We then conclude the proof of correctness by 
showing the self-stabilizing property.
4.5.2.1 No Message Loss or Corruption 
We consider two cases:
(i) Ao data Is recewed /o r tAe route. The path lives for pathJif. Once this timer expires. 
Action tears down the path by sending the TEARDOW Tf message. Thus, the routing 
table entries w ill be correct.
(ii) Tbere Is dato /o r tAe mute. We now give the proof of the properties P I through P5 
for this case.
P ro p e rty  4.1 ,9tarfmg /m m  an orbltrory conhguration, pmpertg E l euentuatZg Aotds.
P ro o f. Upon receiving the D A T A  by Action Rg, the policy gateway checks if the 
pothJd in the message belongs to ezlst_path_ld array (Line 6 .0 2  in Algorithm 4.6). I f  it
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cannot recognize the poth_ld, an E R R O R  message with reason as no_patbld is sent to the 
previous policy gateway. The previous policy gateway executes Action R 3 . It  calls the 
procedure SELECTREPAIRPG (Algorithm 4.21) to select an alternate policy gateway. The 
R E R A JR  message is sent to the alternate pohcy gateway. Action 7^  is enabled, which 
repairs the path by setting the patAJd variable correctly. O
P ro p e rty  4 .2 S'tartlng jrom an arbltrorg conhgnroflon, property P2 euentuaZZp holds.
P ro o f. The pohcy" gateway receives the D A T  A  by executing Action R@. If  the current 
pohcy gateway belongs to an excluded autonomous sy ŝtem, then an E R R O R  message with 
reason as no_domaln is sent to the previous pohcy gateway. The message is forwarded by 
Action Rô towards the source which tears down the path. The source then generates a new 
route, and sends a new ^ E T E R  message to setup the correct path (see Lines 6.05 - 6.07 in 
Algorithm 4.6).
□
P ro p e rty  4 .3  S^tartlng /nom an arbitrary con/igurotlon, pmperty P3 euenfuolZy holds.
P ro o f. The pohcy gateway receives the D A T A  by performing Action Rg. If  
the next pohcy gateway (ezlst_path_neztpg) is not reachable, the pohcy gateway calls the 
procedure SELECTREPAIRPG to select an alternate pohcy gateway. The R ER A JR  message 
is sent to the alternate pohcy gateway. Action Rg sets up the repaired path towards the 
destination. Thus, both the next pohcy gateway (ezlst^ th_neztpg ) and previous pohcy 
gateway (ezlgf_path^eupg) entries w ill be set correctly.
□
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
P ro p e rty  4 .4  S f̂orllng jm m  an arblfran/ con/iguraflo?%, property E4 eventually bolds.
P roo f. By executing Action TZg (Algorithm 4.15), the policy gateway receives 
the D A T A . I f  the flag ezlst_patb_nccept is not set correctly (i.e, it is false) an E R R O R  
message w ith reo,son as no^xitbld is sent to the previous policy gateway. The previous 
policy" gateway executes Action Rg and repairs the path as in the previous case. Thus, 
setting the hag ezlst_potb_accept w ill be set correctly.
□
P ro p erty  4.5 5'tarllng jm m  on arbitrary con/lg?iratlon, property P5 eventually bolds.
P roo f. I f  the transit policies do not allow D A T A  to how through, then a R E E E E E  
message is sent to the previous policy gateway. The previous policy gateway executes Action 
R 4 , and forwards the REEE5^E message w ith no.pg as reason towards the source. The 
source tears down the path and sets up a new path.
□
Lem m a 4.2 (Convergence w ith o u t M essage Loss) S^tartlng jrom an arbitrary con^g- 
uratlon, vntbout considering naessoge losses ond corruption, eventually bolds.
P roo f. The proof fohows from Properties 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.
□
4.5.2.2 Message Loss or Corruption 
We now prove how the message loss and corruption are handled and how the routing 
tables will be coi-rected in hnite time.
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Lem m a 4 .3  (Convergence w ith  Message Loss) ,9tortmg /m m  an arbitrary con^yura- 
tlon. considering message losses and corruption, eventually bolds.
Proof.
The ID P R  protocol, like PCP, passes a copy of the message to C A 4TE. The pohcy 
gateway receives the message from local host by executing Action R^o- ft constructs a 
D A T A G R A M  using the message and then sends it using Action <$i (Algorithm 4.27). By 
executing Action R n , the next pohcy gateway receives the D A T A G R A M . It  performs the 
CA4TR vahdation checks on the D A T A G R A M  by calling the procedure C M TPV A LID A - 
TIONCHECKS. If  it fails to pass any of the checks (i.e, the message is corrupted), the pohcy 
gateway returns A A R  to the sender and discards the D A T A G R A llf. Upon receiving the 
A A R  by performing Action R 13, the pohcy gateway first checks if the number of trans­
missions of the D A T A G R A M  has exceeded the maximum number of transmissions. I f  the 
number is exceeded, then the D A T A G R A M  is discarded. Otherwise, it is retransmitted.
The message loss is dealt with in the fohowing way. I f  the retransmission tim er times out 
before receiving either A G R G H fT R  or A A R , then the pohcy gateway executes Action Tg. 
It  retransmits the D A T A G R A M  provided it has not exceeded the transmission aUotment. 
I f  it has exhausted its allotment, then it discards and informs the ID P R  protocol, which may 
resubmit the control message back to the CA4TR (Lines 25.14 - 25.16 in Algorithm 4.27).
Thus, we proved that in case of message loss and corruption, ah the messages wih be 
either retransmitted or discarded. So, now the proof of the routing table correctness is the 
same as for Lemma 4.2.
□
Theorem  4.1 (Convergence) S'tarllng /bom an arbltrory con/lgurotlou, evenlu-
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ally bolds.
P ro o f. The proof fohows from Lemmas 4.2 and.4 3.
□
T h eo rem  4.2  (S elf-atab ilizing) Algohlbm T D E R  Is self-stabhizing.
P ro o f. Fohows directly from Lemma 4.1 and Theorem 4.1. O
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4.6 Pseudo Code for the Algorithms 
4.6.1 Data Structures (ECE)
A lg o rith m  4.1 Self-Stabilizing Path Control Protocol (Algorithm ECE) for Policy gateway
1 (Constants).
10] Constants:
1.02 n: integer / *  number of policy gateways * /
1.03 k: integer / *  number of autonomous systems * /
1.04 b: integer / *  number of hosts * /
1.05 bmrduiidtb: integer / *  minimum bandwidth required*/
1.06 routedeZny: integer /*  maximum delay * /
1.07 sessloncost : integer /*maximum cost * /
1.08 tbne : integer
1.09 e : integer
/*  The following information is obtained from the routing information database 
it represents the link state * /
1.10 pgas : array [0..n — 1] of 0..b /*  AS id of policy gateways * /
1.11 as : array [0..b — 1] of 0..b /*  AS id of hosts * /
1.12 type: array [0..n — 1] of {ezit, entry} / *  type of pohcy gateway entry or exit * /
1.13 vyreocb : array [0..b — 1,0..b — 1] of boolean /*  reachabihty of As * /
1.14 fntrareocb : array [0..n — l,0..n  — Ij of boolean /*  reachabihty between pohcy gateways * /
1.15 vy :array [0..n — 1] of < 0..b — 1 , 0..b — 1 >
/*  tp-transit pohcy * /
1.16 tp-bw : banduiidtb
1.17 tp_rd : routedeZay
1.18 tp_sc : sessioncost
1.19 tp :array [0..b — 1] of < tp_bui, tp_rd, tp_sc >
1.20 patbA '/ : time / *  hfe time of a path * /
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A lg o rith m  4 .2  Algorithm ECE (Messages)
2.01 Messages:
2 .02 A C C E P T  (potbJd, source, destination)
2.03 potbJd : integer
2.04 source, destination : 0..b — 1
2.05 R EEESE (potb.id, reoson)
2.06 potbJd : integer
2.07 reoson =  {no_py, 7m_reocb, no_patbid, no_tp, no_domoin}
2.06 ERROR (pntb-id, reason)
2.00 patb.id  : integer
2.10 reason =  {no_py, no.reacb, no^patbid, no_tp, noxtomain}
2.11 TEARDOTVA (patbJd, direction)
2 .12 patb_id : integer
2.13 direction =  {prev, nezt}
2.14 R ETEP (potbJd, source, destination, rs, route, routejp, y)
2.15 patb.id : integer
2.16 source, destination : 0..b — 1 
/ *  rs-Requested Services * /
2.17 rs : concotenated string o / rs_bui, rs_rd, rs_sc
2.18 rs-bw : banduiidtb 
rs_rd : routedeZoy
2.19 rs^c : sessioncost
2.20 route : array [0..b — Ij of 0..b
2.21 routejtp :array [0..b — 1] of tpstring
2.22 y : integer
2.23 ACR (patbJd, source, destination)
2.24 patbJd : integer
2.26 source, destination : 0..b — 1
2.26 R E P A IR  (RETEP)
2.27 RETEP .RETEP message
2.28 EATA(dat, patb_id, source, destiîiation, rs, ezcZude)
2.29 dat:data
2.30 patbJd : integer
2.31 source, destination : 0..b — 1
2.32 ezcZude : {e | e E 0..b}
r rs-Requested Services * /
2.33 rs : concatenated string o / rs.bui, rs.rd, rs.sc
2.34 rs.bu; : banduiidtb
2.36 rs.rd : routedeZay
2.36 rs.sc : sessioncost
2.37 DATA(dat, source, destination, rs, ezcZude)
2.38 dat:data
2.39 source, destinotion : 0 ..b — 1
/ *  exclude -Ekimains to be excluded * /
2.40 ezcZmte : {e j e E 0..b}
/ *  rs-Requested Services * /
2.41 rs : concatenated string o / rs.bui, rs.rd, rs.sc
2.42 rs.bui : banduiidtb
2.43 rs.rd : routedeZoy
2.44 rs.sc : sessioncost
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A lg o rith m  4.3  Algorithm PCP (Variables)
3.01 Variables:
3.02 m  : integer
3.03 vngsource, mydestination,g : 0..b — 1 / *  hosts*/
3.04 timegtamp, currenttime : sygtemtime
3.05 p, g, nezt, neztpg, preupg, pg, g : 0..n -  1 / *  pohcy gateways * /
3.06 patb_id, myputb_id : 0 .. m
3.07 status: array [0..n — 1] of {good, bad}
3.08 error/Zag, nezt/Zog : boolean
3.09 b u //e r  : { <  empty > , DATA, ACCEPT, RETEP, REPERE, ERROR,
ACR, R E P A IR , TEARDOM^A}
/ *  Variables correspoding to the pathid * /
3.10 ezist^patbs : array[0..m — 1] of routes
3.11 e z is t^ tb - id  : array [0..m — 1] of patb.id
3.12 e z is t^ tb ^ e v p g  : array [0..m — 1| of 0..n — 1
3.13 ezist_patb_neztpg : array [0..m — 1] of 0..n — 1
3.14 ezist_patb_timestamp : array [0..m — 1] of time
3.15 ezist.piatb_accept : array [0..m — 1] of boolean
/ *  hags to denote start sending messages,sent messages and acknowledgments * /
3.15 consend, senddota, sendsetup, sefidaccept, sendocA: : boolean
3.17 sendrepair, sendre/use, senderror, sendteorprev, sendtearnezt: boolean
3 18 Procedures:
3.19 SETUPCHECKS(in preupg, patb_id, ezist_patb_timestamp, ezist.patb_id, pgas,
as, route, route_tp, y, uyreacZi, tp, out error/Zag, status)
3.20 SELECTNEXTPG(in i, route, / ,  ug, pgas, status, introreocb, ugreocb, type,
out neztpg, y)
3.21 SELECTREPAIRPG(in i, route, / ,  ug, pgas, status, introreocb, vg? eacb, type,
out nezt/Zag)
3.22 ROUTEGEN (in i, d, vgreacb, tp, ? s, ezcZude, tp, out route, route_tp)
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4.6.2 A bstract Version (P C P )
A lgorithm  4.4 Algorithm PCP (Abstract Version Part I)
4 02
01 (%i ) rev DATA from g — ^
/*  generate route * /
ROUTEGEN;
4.03 if route E ezists.patbs — »
4.04 consend, senddoto =  true, true
4.05 [j -i(route E ezist.p)otbs) — »
4.06 potbid =  m j m ^ ezist_potb_id; 
/ *  select next pg * /
4 .0 -  SELECTNEXTPG;
4.08 consend, sendsetup =  true, true
4.09
4.11
4.13
4.14
4.21
4.2
(Pg) [] rev R E T E P  from j  — ^
/ *  perform setupchecks * /  
SETUPCHECKS;
4 .12  i f  (pgos[i] ^  os[destinotion])
/* select next pg * /
SELECTNEXTPG;
if neztpg =  0  — »
4.15 consend, sendre/use, reoson =  true, true, no^g
4.16 []-i(neztpg — 0 ) — ^
4.17 consend; sendsetup =  true, true
4.18 h
4.19 Q (pgos[ij =  os [destinotion]) — i
4 .20 consend, sendoccept =  true, true
Ê
4 .22 (P 3 ) [] rev A C C E P T  from /  — »
4.23 if pgas[i] =  os[source] — ^
4.24 consend, senddota =true, true
4.25 [] pgos[i] ^  os[sou?'ce] — ^
4.26 consend, sendoccept =  true, true
6
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A lgorithm  4.5 Algorithm (Abstract Version Part II)
5.01 (%4) d rev AEPVSÆJ from j  — ^
5.02 if ((reosoa =  no_reoc/i) V (reosmi =  no_tp)) — »
/ *  select next pg * /
5.03 SELECTNEXTPG;
5.04 if nezfpg =  0 — \
5.05 if pgos}fj =  ag[aotfrce] — »
5.06 discard
5.07 [] pgas[ij as(sotirce] — ^
5.08 consend, sendre/nse. reason =  true, true, n,o_pg
5.09 fi
5.10 [|"̂ (nea;fpg =  0) — ^
5.11 cansend, sendsetup =  true, true
5.12 6
5.13 fi
5.14 if reason =  no_pg — »
5.15 if pgos[i] — os[sonrce] — >
5.16 consend, sendteornerf — true, true
5.17 ROUTEGEN;
5.18 SELECTNEXTPG;
5.19 cansend, seTidsetnp =  true, true
6.20 d pgos[t] ^  os[sonrcej — ^
5.21 cansend, sendre/nse, reason — true, true, no.^p
5.22 fi
5.23 fi
5.24 (% ) [I rev EAAOA from j  — »
5.25 if (reason — no^domafn) — >
5.26 if pgas[i] ^  as[sonrce] — »
5.27 consend, scTiderror reason — true, true, no_domain
5.28 [] pgas[i] =  os(source] — ^
5.29 cansend, sendfeornezf =  true, true
5.30 ROUTEGEN;
5.31 SELECTNEXTPG;
5.32 cansend, sendsefnp =  true, true
5.33 Û
5.34 [] reason =  no_pafMd — ^
/*  unrecognized path id * /
5..36 if pat/iJd ^ eirfst_pot/iJd — ^
5.36 discard
5.37 d pofhJd e e iis f^ th J d  — »
/ *  existing path * /
5.38 SELECTREPAIRPG;
/ *  cannot select nextpg teardown the path * /
5.39 if —(neict/fag) — »
5.40 cansend, sendfeorpren, directfon=true, true, prer
5.41 d if (nead/fap) — »
5.42 cansend, sendrepair =  true, true
5.43 6
5 44 6
5.46 fi
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A lgorithm  4.6 Algorithm PCP (Abstract Version Part III)
6.01 (Pg) d rev DATA from
6.04
6.30
6.31
r umecognlzed path id * /
6.02 if pafhJd 0  erisf-pofhJd — »
6.03 cansend, senderror, reason =  true, tme, no_pathid
/ *  cheek for exclude array
6.05 if (pgas[i] e ezclnde) — »
6.06 cansend, senderror, reason =  true, true, no_do?nain
6.07 h
/ *  check for Transit policies * /
6.08 if tp|pgas[i]] ^  rs — ^
6.09 cansend, sendre/use, reason =  true, true, no_pg
6.10 h
6.11 if (pgas[i] =  as[desfinafion]) — ^
6.12 dehver dat
6.13 cansend, sendact =  true, true
6.14 d(P9(*^H 7  ̂as|desfinafion]) — »
6.15 nead =  nerfpg;
6.16 z, z =  pgas(i], pgas[nead];
6.17 if -i(t;greach[r, z])) — >
6.18 SELECTREPAIRPG;
/ *  cannot select nextpg teardown the path * /
6.19 if -i(nead/lag) — ^
6.20 cansend, sendteorpreu, direction=true, true, p rer
6.21 d (nerf/lag) — >
6.22 cansend, sendrepair — true, true
6.23 6
6.24 d^^Goch[r, z ]  1
6.25 if erist_pafh_occepf[pathJd] =  true
6.26 bn //er =  DATA;
6.27 cansend, senddafa =  true, true
6.28 dG3:ief-path_accepf[path_tdl ^  true — »
6.29 cansend, senderror, reason =  true, true, no_pafhid
h
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A lg o rith m  4.7 Algorithm PCP (Abstract Version Part IV)
T .O T
T.08
7.09
7.10
7.11
7.12
(P ;) [] rev TEAPDOM 'A horn j  — ^
V m I eiist-pof/i_id[7n] =  pathJd — i- 
eT'ist_pat/i_id[m] =  0 ; 
if ((pgo,s[zj =  as[source]) V (pgas[7j =  os[desfmation])) 
discard
((pgas)i] ^  as [source]) A (pgas[i] as[desfi7Wition]))
/*  propr^ate teardown towards originator * /  
if direction =  preu — i-
cansend, sendtearpreu= tme. tme 
/ *  propagate teardown towards destination * /
|j direction = 
cansend,
fi
nead — »
sendteorpreu= tme, tme
(Pg) [I rev AC A  from j  — i-
if ppas[i] =  os [source] —  ̂
discard 
[] pgas[i] ^  as[source] — /
cansend; sendock — tme, tme
fi
7.19 (Pg) [] rev PEPAdP from j  — »
/*  perform setup checks
7.20 SETUPCHECKS:
7.21 if (pgas[i] as[destination]) — ^
/*  select next pg * /
7 22 SELECTNEXTPG:
7.23 if neadpg =  0 — »
7.24 cansend; sendre/use, reoson =  tme, true, no_pg
7.25 []-i(neadpg =  0) — »
7.26 cansend, sendrepair =  true, tme
7.27 h
7.28 fi
7.29 if (ppas[i] =  as[destination]) — ^
7.30 cansend, sendoccept =  tme, tme
7.31 fi
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A lg o rith m  4.8  Algorithm PCP (Abstract Version Part V )
8 .10
8.11
8.01 (5 i) Q if (cansend) — r
8.02 if (senddata)
8.03 send DAT A to neztpg;
8.04 senddata =  false ;
8.05 [] if(sendsetup)
8.06 send ^DTDP to neadpg:
8.0T sendsetup =  false;
8.08 [] if(sendaccept)
8.09 send ACCDPT to preupg; 
sendoccept =  false;
[] if(sendrefuse)
8.12 send PDPDPD to preupp;
8.13 sendre/use =  false;
8.14 [] if (senderror)
8.15 send DPPOP to preupg;
8.16 senderror =  false;
8.17 [I if(sendteamext)
8.18 send TD A jR D O lW  to neztpg;
8.19 sendteamext =  false;
8.20 0 if(8endtearprev)
8.21 send T D A P D O IW  topreupp;
8.22 sendteorprer =  false;
8.23 [] if(sendack)
8.24 send ACA to preupp;
8.25 sendack =  false;
8.26 d if(sendrepmr)
8.27 send ADPAJP to nertpp;
8.28 sendrepair — false;
8.29 f i
8.30 cansend =  false
8.31 f i
8.32 (6"i) TIM EOUT (V potfi-id { (eiist_patfi_ti7nesta7np[patkJd] — currenttime >  patfiJ i/
8.33 if (ppas[i] =  as[saarcej) — ^
8.34 6 n //e r =  TDAPDOM/'A;
8.35 cansend, sendteamext =  true, true
8.36 D (ppas[i] =  as[destinationj) — >
8.37 6u //e r — TDAADOM^A'̂ ;
8.38 cansend, sendtearpreu =  true, true
8.39 [|(ppas[i] A os[source] Appas[i] as[destination])
8.40 6u//e7- =  TDAADOIVA;
8.41 cansend, sendteornext =  true, true;
8.42 sendteorpreu =  true
8.43 f i
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4.6.3 Full Version (PCP)
A lg o rith m  4.9  Algorithm PCP (Full Version Receive Data &om host)
/*  data message from host acts as route request message * /
9.01 (P i) rev DATA(dut, source, destination, rs, exclude) from p — »
9.02 ROUTEGEN(inppas[i], as[destinotion], upreoch, tp,
rs, exclude, tp. out route, route_tp);
/*p a th  exists already * /
9.03 if route E  exist_pat/is — *
9.04 mppathid — exist^at/is|?oute].pat/i_id
9.05 nextpp =  exist_poth_nextpp[?nppathid];
9.06 h u //er — DATA;
9.07 cansend, senddata—true, true
9.08 D -i(route E exist.j)aths) — »
9.09 liu //e r =  dat;
9.10 pathid — m I m ^ exist_pat/i_id;
8 11 y =
9.12 /  —p;
9.13 SELECTNEXTPG(in i, route, / ,  up, j%as, status, intrareach, upreach,
tppe, out nextpp, p);
9.14 exist_path_id[7n +  1] =  path_id;
9.15 exist_path_nextpp|path_id] =  nextpp;
9.16 exist.pafh_preupp[pat/i_id] =  preupp;
9.17 exist_path_timestanip|path_id] =  currenttime;
9.18 6u //e r  =  5^AT17P;
9.19 consend, sendsetup =  true, true
9.20 fi
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A lgorithm  4.10 Algorithm PCP (Pull Version Receive Setup)
10.01 (Pg) |] rev 5'ATVP(path_id, source, destination, rs, route, route.tp, p) from j  — ^
10.02 error/lag =  /olse;
10.03 preupp =  j;
10.04 SETUPCHECKS(in preupp, pat/:_id, exist.path_timestamp, exist.path_id, ppns,
os, route, route_tp, p, upreocn, tp, out e?Tor/lop, stotus);
10.06 if -I(error/lop) — ^
10.06 if (ppos[i] os[desti7iotion)) — ^
10.07 /  =  p;
10.08 SELECTNEXTPG(in i, route, / ,  up, ppos, status, intrareacA, upreacd,
tppe, out nextpp, p);
10.09 if nextpp =  0 — »
10.10 bu //er =  RE'Pf/5'E';
10.11 cansend, sendre/use, reason =true, true, no^p
10.12 []-'(nextpp =  0) — ^
10.13 exist.patA_id[7n +  1] =  patAJd;
10.14 exist_path_nextpp[pat/i_id] =  nextpp;
10.15 exist_path.preupp[patAddj =  preupp;
10.16 exist_patd_ti7nesta)np[patli,_id] =  currenttime;
10.17 l)u //er =  S^iGTf/P;
10.18 conscTid, se7rdsetup=true, true
10.19 fi
10.20 [] (ppas[i] =  os[destination)) — »
10.21 nextpp — preupp;
10.22 mpdestination =  source;
10.23 mpsource =- destination;
10.24 6u //e r =  ACCAPT;
10.25 exist.^tduaccept[poth_id] — true ;
10.26 cansend, sendaccept =  true, true
10.27 fi
10.28 fi
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A lgorith m  4.11 Algorithm PCP (Full Version Receive Accept )
/ *  mysource=destination,rayde8tmation=originator * /
11.0! (% ) [] rev ACCDRr(pat/i_id, mpsource, mpdestination) from j  
/ *  propagate accept towards the originator * /
11.02 ifpgos[i] ^  03[mpdestinot*on] — »
11.03 cxist_path_acceptfpoth_id] =  tme;
11.04 preupp — exist_path_preupp[poth_idl:
11.05 6u //e r — ACCART;
11.06 cansend, sendaccept=tme, true 
/ *  originator sends the dat * /
11.07 [] ppos[i] =  as[mpdestinotion] — i
11.08 exist_path_accept[patd_id] =  true;
11.09 nextpp =  exist_poth_nextpp[path_id];
11.10 6u //e r =  DATA:
11.11 consend, senddato=true, tme
fi11.12
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A lgorithm  4.12 Algorithm RCP (Full Version Receive Refuse)
12.01 (%4) [] rev REFZ75^F(poth_id, reoson) from j  — »
/ *  select alternate P G  * /
12.02 if ((reason =  no_reach) V  (reason =  no_tp)) — ^
12.03 /  — 2/1 route [p] =  ppos[i);
12.04 SELECTNEXTPG(in i, route, / ,  up, ppos, status, intrareach, upreach,
tppe, out nextpp, p);
12.05 if ne.xtpp =  0 — i
12.06 6u //e r =  REFC/5'F;
12.07 cansend, sendre/use, reason=true, true, T io ^
12.08 []-,(nextpp =  0) — 1
12.09 exist-poth-idfm +  1] =  poth_id;
12.10 exist_path_nextpp[path_id] =  nextpp;
12.11 exist_path_preupp[pathJd]=: preupp;
12.12 exist_poth_ti7nestaTnp[poth_id] — currenttime;
12.13 hu //er =  SETDP;
12.14 cansend, sendsetup =  true, true
12.15 fi
12.16 [] reason — no_pp — i
12.17 if ppas[i] ^  as[source] — »
/*  No pg exist8:propagate refuse to originator * /
12.18 preupp — exist_poth_preupp[poth_id];
12.19 6u //e r =:
12.20 cansend, sendre/use, reason =  true, true, no_pp
12.21 D ppas|i] =  as[source] — i
/ *  teardown the path * /
12.22 6u //e r =  TFA R D O TW ;
12.23 cansend, sendteamext, direction =  true, true, next
12.24 ROUTEGEN(in ppas[i], as[destination], upreach. tp,
rs, excZude, tp, out r oute, routedp);
12.25 SELECTNEXTPG(in i, route, / ,  up, ppos, stotus, intrareoch
upreach, tppe, out nextpp, p);
12.26 bu //er =  gFTVR;
12.27 cansend; sendsetup =  true, true
12.28 fi
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A lgorithm  4.13 Algorithm RCR (Full Vsrsion Receive Error)
13.01 (TZg) (] rev FRRC)R(pathJd, reason) from /  — »
13.02 if (reason =  noxZomain) — ^
13.03 if ppas[ij as[sonrce] — ^
13.04 prei'pp =  exist_path.preupg[pnthJd];
13.05 W y/er =  ERROR;
13.06 consend, senderror, reoson=true, true, no_domain
13.07 [| ppos[ij =  os [source] — i
13.08 Ziu//er =  TEARDO IFA;
13.09 consend, sendteornext, direction= true, true, next
13.10 ROUTEGEN(in ppos[i], os[destinotion], upreoch, tp, 
rs, excZude, tp, out route, 7'oute_fp);
13.11 SELECTNEXTPG(in i, route, / ,  up, ppos, status, intrareoch
upreoch, tppe, out nextpp, p);
13.12 hu/yer^R ETZ/R :
13.13 cansend, sendsetup =  true, true
13.14 fi
13.16 [] reason =  no.pothid — »
/*  unrecognized path id * /
13.16 if pothJd ^ exist_path_id — i
13.17 discard
13.18 [] pathJd s exist_path_id — >
/*  existing path * /
13.19 SELECTREPAIRPG(in i, route, / ,  up, ppos, status, intrareach, upreach,
tppe, out nextpp, p);
/ *  cannot select nextpg teardown the path * /
13.20 if -i(nextyZap) — »
13.21 huy/er =  TEARDOR^A;
13.22 consend, sendtearpreu, direction=true, true, preu
13.23 [](nextyZap) — ^
13.24 huy/er =  RERAfR;
13.26 cansend, se7rdrepoir=:true, true
fi13.28
13.27
13.28
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A lgorith m  4 .14 Algorithm RCR (Full Version Receive Data Part I)
14.01 (Re) [I rcvDATAZdat, pothJd, source, destination, rs, excZude) from j
14.02 error/Zug =  /uZse;
14.03 Tiextpp =  exist_path_nextpg[path_id];
14.04 preupp =  exist^th_preuppfpath_idj;
/ *  unrecognized path id " /
14.05 if pothJd ^ exist.j)athJd — i
14 06 error/Zop =  true;
07 6 u //e r =  ERROR;
08 consend, senderror, reoson =  true, true, no.pothid
09 fi
/ *  check for exclude array * /  
if -n(error/Zop) — »
if (ppos[i] e excZude) — » 
error/Zop =  true; 
stotus [i] =  bod; 
b u //er =  ERROR;
conse/id, senderror, reoson =  true, true, no_domoin
14.10
14.11
14.12
14.13
14.14
14.15
14.16
14.17
14.18
14.19
14.20
14.21
14.22
14.23
14.24
14.25
fi
fi
/ *  check for Transit policies * /  
if -i(error/Zop) — »
if tp[ppos[i]] ^  rs — 1 
error/Zop =  true; 
status [i] =  bad; 
bu //er =  REFERE;
consend, sendre/use, reason =  true, true, no_pp
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A lg o rith m  4.15 Algorithm RCR (Full Version Receive data-partS)
14.26 if (pgoa[*] ^  asldestinotionj) — i
/ *  next pg is not reachable try to repair the path * /
14.27 next =  nextpp;
14.28 X ,  z =  ppas[i], ppas[next];
14.29 if -'(upreac/i[x, z])) — i
14.30 error/Zap =  true;
14.31 SELECTREPAIRPG(in i, 7-oute, / ,  up, ppos, stotus, introreoch, upreach,
tppe, out nextpp, p);
/ *  cannot select nextpg teardown the path * /
14.32 if -'(next/Zap) — »
14.33 buy/er^TEARDOiVA'^;
14.34 co?isend, sendtearpreu, direction=true, true, preu
14.35 [l(nextyZap) — »
14.36 buyyer =  RERAfR;
14.37 cansend, sendrepair=true, true
fi14.38
14.30
14.47
14.48
14.5
fi
14.40 if -'(erroryZap) — i
/ *  send dat to next pg * /
14.41 if exist_path_occepf [path-id] =  true
14.42 buyyer =  D A TA ;
14.43 cansend, senddata =  true, true
14.44 Qexist_poth_accept[path_id] /=  true — i
14.45 buyyer =  ER R O R ;
14.46 consend, senderror, reason — true, true, no_pathid
fi
fi
14.49 fi; /  * endi destzTiation * /
14.50 if (ppas[ij =  as[desti7iation])
deliver dot:
14.52 buyyer ^ACR";
14.53 coTisend, scndack=true, true
14.54 fi
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A lg o rith m  4.16 Algorithm PCR (Full Version Receive teardown,ack)
15.01
15.02
15.03
15.04
15.05
15.06
15.07
10.08
15.09
15.10
15.11
1-5.12
15.13
15.14
15.15
15.16
(Ry)!] rev TEARD 0 1 FA(path_id, direction) from j  ^
V  m  I ex i8 t_pa th_ id [m 1 — p a th _ id  —  ̂
e x i8 t_ p o th _ id [m ] — 0; 
e x ig t_ p a th ..p re u p g [p a th _ id | =  0; 
e x is t^ th _ n e x tp p [p a th _ id {  =  0;
i f  ( (p p n s [i]  =  as [s o u r  ce]) V (p p a s ]i] =  as [d e s t in a t io n ] ) )  — 
d isca rd
[] ( (p p a s [ ij os [so u rc e ]) A  (p p a s [ij y^ as  [d e s t in a t io n ]) )
/ *  p ro p a g a te  te a rd o w n  to w a rd s  o r ig in a to r  * /  
i f  d i r e c t io n  =  p re u  — i-
b u / / e r  =  T E A R D O I F A ;
can sen d . s e n d te a rp re u , d i r e c t io n ^  t ru e ,  t ru e ,  p re u  
/ *  p ro p a g a te  te a rd o w n  to w a rd s  d e s t in a tio n  * /
[] d ir e c t io n  =  n e x t  — ^
b u / / e r  =  T E A R D O iV A ;
can sen d , s e n d te o rp re u , d i r e c t io n ^  t ru e , t ru e ,  p re u
6
17 (R g ) Q re v  A C R (p a th _ id ,  s o u rce , d e s t in a t io n )  f ro m  j
18 i fp p a s [ i]y ^ a s [s o u rc e ]  — »
19 p re u p p  =  e x is t_ p a th _ p re u p p [p a th d d ];
20 can sen d , sendack  =  t ru e ,  tru e
21 |] p p a s [i] =  os  [source ] — ^
22 d isca rd
23 fi
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A lgorithm  4.17 Algorithm RCR (Full Version Receive repair)
16.01 ( % )  0 re v  R E R A IR ( R E T E R )  f ro m  ;  — v
16.02 preupp =  j
18.03 i f  (ppas[i] a .9 [d e s tin a fio n ]) — >
/ *  p e rfo rm  checks as in  se tup  m essage * /
16.04 S E T U P C H E C K 5 (m  p re u p p , p o th J d ,  e x is t_ p a th _ tim e a ta m p , e x is t_ p a th J d ,  ppas,
as, ro u te , ro u te _ tp , p, u p i each, tp , o u t e r ro r /Z a p , s ta tu s ) ;
16.05 i f  - i(e r ro ry Z a p )  — i
16.06 /  =  (/;
16.07 S E LE C T N E X T P G (Î7 i i ,  ro u te ,  / ,  up , pp as , s ta tu s , in t r a r e a c h ,  u p re a ch ,
tppe , o u t n e x tp p , p );
/ *  p a th  c a n n o t be re p a ire d  * /
16.08 i f  n e x tp p  =  0 — »
16.09 fiu/yer =  REFERE;
16.10 cansend , s e n d re /u s e ,  re o s o n =  tru e , t r u e .n o ^ p
18.11 [ ]- '(n e x tp p  =  0) — 1
18.12 e x is t_ p a th J d [7 n  +  1] =  p a th _ id ;
16.13 e x is t_ p a th _ n e x tp p [p a th _ id ] =  n e x tp p ;
16.14 e x is t_ p a th .p re u p p [p o th _ id ] =  p re u p p ;
16.16 e x is t_ p a th _ tim e s ta 7 n p |p a th _ id ] =  c u r r e n t t im e ;
16.16 b u /y e r  =  R E F A Z R ;
16.17 can sen d ; s e n d re p o ir= t ru e ,  t ru e
16.18 h
16.19 f i
16.20 f i ;
16.21 i f  (pp as [i] =  o s [d e s t in a tio n ])  — >
16.22 n e x tp p  — p re up p ;
16.23 m p d e s t in o t io n  =  sou rce ;
16.24 m p s o u rc e  — d e s tiT U itio n ;
16.25 buy yer =  AEEEFT;
16.28 can sen d , se n d a c c e p t=  t ru e , t ru e
16.27 f i
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A lg o rith m  4.18 Algorithm RCP (Pull Version Send Actions)
17.0] (Ri) if  (cansend) — »
17.02 if (senddata)
17.03 sendDATA(dat, poth_id, source, destination, rs, excZude) to nextpg;
17.04 senddata= false;
17.05 D if(sendsetnp)
17.06 send R E T E R  (p a th _ id , sou rce , d e s tiT u it io n , r s ,  ro u te ,  r o ir te d p ,  p ) to  n e x tp g ;
17.07 sendsetup =  fedse;
17.08 [j if(sendaccept)
17.09 send A C C E R T  (path_id. source, destination) to preupg;
17.10 sendaccept =  false;
17.11 [] if(sendrefuse)
17.12 send R E F E R E  (pathJd, reason) to preupp;
17.13 sendre/use =  false;
17.14 d if(senderror)
17.15 send E R R O R  (pathJd, reason) to preupp;
17.16 senderror =  false;
17.17 d if(sendtearnext)
17.18 send T E A R D O iV A  (pathJd. direction) to nextpp;
17.19 seW tearnext =  false;
17.20 d if(sendtearprev)
17.21 send T E A R D O iV A (p ath _ id , direction) to preupp;
17.22 sendtearpreu — false;
17.23 d if(sendack)
17.24 send A O A  (path-id, source, desti/iation) to preupp;
17.25 sendack =  false;
17.26 d if(sendrepair)
17.27 send R E R A fR  (R E F E R ) to nextpp;
17.28 sendrepair — false;
17.29 6
17.30 cansend =  fsilse
17.31 fi
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A lgorithm  4.19 Algorithm RCR (Full Version TimeOut Actions)
18.01 (R i)  ' l I M E O U T  ( V p a th . id  | (e x is t_ p u th _ tim e s ta m p [p a th _ id | — c u r r e n t t im e  >  p c t h J i / ) )
18.02 i f  (p p u s [i] =  as [sou rce  I)
bu/yer =  TEÆRDOWA; 
can sen d , s e n d te a m e x t =  t ru e ,  t ru e  
d (p p o s [i[ =  os [d e s tin a t io n !)  — » 
Lyyer^TEARDO M G V; 
can sen d , s e n d te a rp re u  =  tru e ,  t ru e  
[ [(p p a s |i| os [sou rce ! A p p a s [ i]  y^ a s [d e s t in a tio n [)  
buyyer =  TE A R boiV A ; 
cansend , s e n d te a m e x t =  tru e , tru e ; 
s e n d te a rp re u  =  tru e
fi
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A lg o rith m  4.20 Algoritlmi RCR (Proccxlure:SELECTNEXTPG )
Procedure SELECTNEXTPG(in *, route, / ,  up, ppos, status, mtroreoch, 
upreach, tppe, out nextpp, p)
19.01 begin
19.02 if ( tp p e [ il =  e n t rp )  — >
19.03 X ,  z =  route[/j,?oute[y +  l j :
19.04 p i  =  3 pp  I ((up [p p j =  p p a s [i])
A (s ta tu s [p p ] =  pood) A (pp i )  A 
in tr a r e o c h [ i ,p p ]  A u p (p p )) ;
19.03 H p i  — »
19.06 n e x tp p  =  pp  I ((up [pp ] -  p p a s [i])
A (s ta tu s [p p ] =  pood) A  (pp y^ i )  A 
in tra re a c h [ i,p p ]  A  u p (p p )) ;
2/ =  /
fi
19.09 [] ( tp p e [i]  =  e x i t )  — »
19.10 x,z —route[/],route[/ +  l];
19.11 p2 =  3 pp I ((up[pp] =  up[i))
A  (s ta tu s [p p ] =  pood) A (pp y^ i )  A u p re a c h [x ,z ]
A u p (p p ) A  ppas[pp ] =  ro u te [y  +  1 ]);
19.12 if p2 — '
19.13 n e x tp p  =  pp  I (up |pp ] =  u p [i]
A  (s ta tu s |p p ] =  pood) A  (pp  y^ i )  A  u p re a c h [x , z)
A  u p (p p ) A (ppas[pp] =  r o u te ] /  +  1 ])) ;
19.14 P =  /  +  1
19.07
19.08
19.15
19.16
19.17 end
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A lgorithm  4.21 Algorithm RCR (ProcedureiSELBCTREPAIRPG )
Procedure SELECTREPAIRPG(in i, route, / ,  up, ppos, stutu*, mtrareoc/r, 
upreach, tppe, out next/Zop)
begin20.01  ^
20.02 i f
20.03
20.04
20.05
20.06
20.07
20.08
20.09
20.10 
20.11 
20.12  
20.13
20.15
20.16
20.17
20.18
20.19
20.20 
20.21 
20.22
20.23
20.24
(i)g\t\ ^  vglnext])  — t select a peer to  n e x t * /  
p i  =  3  g I ((np [g ] =  u p [n e x t])  A 
u p (g ) A  m tr a r e a c h [ i ,  g ]); 
i f  ( p i )  — ^
n e x tp p  =  g | ((up [g ] — u p [n e x t])  A 
u p (g ) A  in t r a r e a c h [ i ,  g ]); 
b u / / e r  =  R E R A IR ;  
can,send, s e r td re p a ir  =  t ru e , t r u e
0 -"(pi) — '
b u / / e r  =  T E A R D O I P A ;
can se n d , s e n d te a rp re u , d ir e c t io n  =  t ru e , tru e ,  p re u
fi
u p [i] =  u p [n e x t] — ^
p, z  =  p p a s ]i] ,  ppas  [n e x t]
/ *  se lect a peer to  n e x t d ir e c t ly  co n ne c te d  to  i  * /  
p i  =  3  g I ((up [g ] =  u p [n e x t[)  A  (ppas[g ] =  pp os [? re x t])A  
u p re a c h [p ,z ] A  u p (g )) ;
if (Pl) — '
n e x tp p  =  g | ((up [g ] =  u p [n e x t])  A  (ppas[g ] =  a s [n e x t])  A 
u p re a ch  [p ,z ] A  u p (g )) ; 
b u / / e r  =  R E R A fR ;  
con se n d , s e n d re p a ir=  tru e ,  t r u e  
n e x t /Z o p  — tru e
fi; 
i f
20.25
20.26
20.27
20.28  
20.28
20.30
20.31
20.32
20.33
20.34
20.36
20.36
20.37
20.38
20.38
20.40 end
'(n e x t /Z a p )  — » /*s e le c t  a pe e r to  n e x t w h ic h  is connected  to  peer o f  i  
p2  =  3  (p, g) I ((up [g ] =  u p [n e x t) ]  A  (ppas[g] =  a s [n e x t])  A 
(u p [i] =  up [p ]) A (p p a s [ i ]= p p o s [p ] )  A  i7 r t r o r e o c h [ i ,p ]A  
u p re o c /i [p, z ]) ;  
i f  (p2 ) — ^
n e x tp p  =  p  I ((up [g ] =  u p [n e x t ] )  A  (ppas[g ] =  o s [n e x t])  A
( u p [ i ] — up [p ]) A  ( p p a s [ i ]= p p a s [p ] )  A in t r a r e a c h [ i , p ] A
u p re o c h [p ,z ]) ;
b u //er =  RERAIR;
can se n d , s e n d re p a ir  =  t ru e ,  t r u e
n e x t/Z a p  =  t ru e
fi
fi;
i f  - '( n e x t /Z o p )  — i / *  se lect a  pe e r to  i  an d  d ire c t ly  connected  to  n e x t * /  
p3  =  3 p  I ( (u p [i]  =  up [p ]) A (p p a s [i] =  pp as [p ]) A 
in tra re o c h . [ i ,p ]  A  u p re a c h [p ,z ]) ;  
i f  (p3 ) — >
n e x tp p  = p  I ( (u p [i]  =  u p [p ]) A  (p p o s [i] = p p a s [p ] )  A
in t r a r e o c h [ i ,p ]  A  u p re a c h [p . z ]) ;
h u //e r =  RERAIR;
can se n d , s e n d re p a ir=  t ru e ,  tru e ;
n e x t /Z a p  =  tru e
fi
fi
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Algorithm . 4.22 Algorithm RCR (Procedure:SETUPCHECKS)
Procedure SETUPCHECKS(ln preupp, pathJd. exist_path_timestom.p. cxist.g)athJd, ppas, 
os, route, ?'oute_tp, p, upreoch, tp, o u t error/Zap. status)
2 1 .
2 1 .
2 1 ,
21.
2 1 .
2 1 ,
2 1 .
2 1 .
2 1 .
2 1 ,
21 .
2 1 ,
2 1 .
21
2 1 .
2 1 .
21,
21
2 1 .
2 1 .
21
2 1 .
2 1 .
21.
.02
.03
,04
,05
.06
.or
.08
.09
,10
.11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20 
21
.22
23
24 
25 
,26 
,27
begin
/'* check for duphcates * /  
if  pathJd E exi,st_path_i(Z —  ̂
error/Zap =  true; 
discard
fi;
/*c iieck if  current domain * /  
if  -,(error/Zap) — ^
if ppas[i] route [p] —  ̂
error/Zap =  true;
send ERROR(path_id, noxZomain) to preupp
fi
fi;
/ *  check for VG  reachabiht}' * /  
if  - 1  (error/Zap) — ^
if ppas[i] ^  os [destination] — ^
X ,  z =  route[p], route[p +  l]; 
if -'(up(upreoch[x.zl)) —  ̂
error/Zap =  true; 
status [i] — bad;
send R EFER E(path_id , no_reach) to preupp
fi
fi
fi:
/ *  check for Transit pohcies * /  
if -i(error/Zop) — »
if tp[ppas[i]j ŷ  route_tp[p] — / 
error/Zap =  true; 
stotus [i] =  bad;
send REFERE(poth_id , ?%o_tp) to preupp
fi
fi
/ *  check for exclude array * /  
if -i(error/Zap) — ^
if (ppas[i] E excZude) —  ̂
error/Zap =  true; 
status[i] =  bad;
send ERROR(path_id, nojom oin) to preupp
fi
fi
end
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
A lg o rith m  4.23 Algorithm RCR (ProcedurezROUTBGEN Part I  )
Procedure ROUTEGEN(in i, d, upreach, tp, rs, excZude, tp, out route, route_fp)
22.01 local
22.02 ZeueZ : 0..k
22.03 parefd : arrap [0..k -  1] 0 / 0..k -  1
22.04 dist : arrap [0..k — 1] o / 0..k — 1
22.06 done : arrap [0..k — Ij o / fiooZean
22.06 p, g : 0..k
22.07 r,temp : 0..k —1
22.08 begin
/"Initialize array done to false * /
22.09 P =  0;
22.10 do p <  k — >
22.11 donejp], p =  /aZse, p +  1
22.12 od
/*  Define parent and dist of node i * /
22.13 ZeueZ, parent[i], dist[i], done[i] — 0, i, 0, true;
/ *  Define parent and diet of every other node p * /
22.14 ZeueZ =  1;
22.15 do ZeueZ <  k — »
22.16 p =  0;
22 .17 do p <  k — »
22.16 if done[p] — »
/*  Node p belongs to previous level * /
22.1S skip
[]-idone|p] — >
/*  Node p belongs to current level * /
9 =  0;
22.20
22.21
22.22 do p < k
22.23
22.24
22.25 O d
22.26 f i ;  p  =  p  +  1
22.27 od; ZeueZ — ZeueZ +  1
22.25
if (done[p] A dist[gj =  ZeueZ — 1 A 
ugreoch|p, g| A tp[p] =  rs A 
p ^ excZude) — i 
parent[p], dist[p] =  g, ZeueZ; 
done[p], g =  true, k 
d -i(done[gi A dist[g] =  ZeueZ — lA  
upreachlp. gj A  tp[p] =  rs A 
p ^ excZude) — » g =  g 4-1
fi
od;
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A lgorithm  4.24 Algonthni PCR (ProcedureiROUTEGEN Part II)
/ *  compute route * /
22.29 if -idone[d] — »
/"there is no pohcy route * /
22.30 route [0] =  pgas[ij + t 1
22.31 [] do?re[dj —
/*  there is a route * /
22.32 r =  dist[d];
22.33 route]r], route[r +  l ] = d ,  d;
22.34 do route[r] yt % — ^
22.3B temp =  parent [ro?de[r]];
22.36 route[r — 1], r =  temp, r — 1;
22.37 route_tp =  tp[temp]
22.38 od
22.39
22.40 end
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4.6.4 C.A4TP
A lgorithm  4.25 Control Message Transport ProtocolfAlgoritlim C.MTR) for Policy gate­
way i (Part I)
23.01 Messages:
23.02 7 D P R M E R R A G E (P C P M E R R A G E , numo/? etranamissions)
23 03 P C P A fE R R A G E  == {D A T A , A C C E P T , R E T E P , R E F E R E , E R R O R ,
A C E , R E P .4 IR , T E A R D O IF A }
23.04 nu7no/retrana?niaaiona :integer
23.05  D A T AGRAM (7DPRMERRAGE, trans Jd, length, auth.uaZue)
23.06 length : integer
23.07 auth_ualue : integer
23.08 transTd : 0..t — 1 / *  transaction id * /
23.08 A A E C m ik ', transJd, length, auth.uolue)
23.10 length : integer
23.11 auth_ualue : integer
23.12 trnnsTd : 0..t — 1 / *  transaction id * /
23.13 A C E C A fT P  =  ('acE, tranaJd, length, outh.ualue)
23 14 length : integer
23.15 outh_uolue : integer
23.16 tronsAd : 0..t — 1 / *  transaction id * /
2 3 17 V ariab les:
23.18 t, m : integer /"  transaction id * /
23.19 length : integer
23.20 auth-ualue : integer
23.21 nu7no/retrans7nissions,7naxtransmit : integer
23.22 e rro r/lag  : boolean
23.23 pg : 0 .. n-1 / *  policy gateway
23.24 exist_trans_id : arrap[0..7n — 1] o /  0..t — 1
23.25 exist_datogrom : orrop[0..t — 1] o / DATAGRAAf
23.26 exist_datagrom_nu7no/retrons7nit : arrog] 0..t — 1] o / integer
23.27 dg D A TA G R A M
23.28  sendnow, send_dg, consendjick, cansend_nak, e rro r/lag , dg_sent : boolean
23 29 Procedures:
23.30  CMTPVALIDATIONCHECKS(in DAT AGRAM ,o ut error/lag)
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A lgorith m  4.26 Algorithm CA4TP (Part II)
24.01 (R io ) rev Z D P R M E R R A G E  from localhost — ^
24.02 tranaJd =  t 1 1  ^ exist-tranaJd;
24.03 length =  EEAG TE(Afesaoge);
24.04 outh_uol — AEjTRvALEE(M eggage);
24.05 D A T A G R A M  =  (Message, tranaJd, length, auth_uolue);
24.06 exi.st_datagrom[tTans_i(l] =  D A T A G R A M
24.07 existxlatagra7n_numo/retrans7nit[transTd] =  numa/retronsTnissions;
24.08 sendAg — true;
24.09 sardnoiu =  true
24.10 ( R i i )  d rev D A T A G R A M  from pg — »
24.11 ' C M TPYA LID ATIO NC H EC K SO ;
24.12 if (e rro r/lag ) — »
24.13 A Æ  — ('nak', transdd, length, auth.ualue)
24.14 cansend_nak =  true;
24.15 sendnotu =  true;
24.16 []-i(error/lag) — '
24.17 A G E G M T R — ('ack', transJd,length, auth.ualue)
24.18 deliver 7 D R R M E R R A G E  to loealhost
24.19 cansend_ack=true;
24.20 sendnoui=true;
24.21 fi
24.22 (R 1 2 ) [] rev A G E G M T R  from pg —
24.23 C M TP VA LID ATIO NC H EC K SO ;
24.24 if (e rro r/lag ) — »
24.25 discard
24.26 [|-'(erro r/lag ) — ^
24.27 ack_rcud =  true;
24.28 discard dg | dg — exist_datogram[tronsJd]
24.29 fi
24.30 (R 1 3 ) 0  rev A^AE from pg — ^
24.31 ' C M TPVA LID ATIO NC H EC K SO ;
24.32 if (e rro r/lag ) — ^
24.33 discard
24.34 |)-i(erro r/lag ) — ^
24.35 nak_rcud := true;
24.36 dg =  exist_datagra7n[trans_id]
24.37 moxtransmit =  exist_datagra7n_nu7no/retransTnit[trons_id]
24.38 if currentTronsmission >  m axtransm it — ^
24.39 discard dg
24.40 [jcurrentdransTnisslon <  m axtransm it — »
24.41 send_dg =  true;
24.42 sendnou'=true;
24 .43  f i
24.44 fi
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A lgorithm  4 .27 (Algorithm CAiTT^) (Part III )
25.01 (% ) [j i f  (se iid iiow )
25.02
25.03 
2-5.04
25.05
25.06
25.07
25.08
25.09
25.10
25.11
25.12
25.13
if (send-dg) — >
send DAT.4GRAM  
dg_sent=true; 
send_dg—false; 
curre?it_tronsmissii)n =  
[j if(send_ack) — »
send A C E C M TP  to pg 
send_nck=false;
|j if(send_nok) — » 
send AAÉ' to pg 
send_nok=false:
currentdronsmission +  1 ;
25.i4(R2)GTIMEOUT(dg_sentA —(ack_rc?;dV nak.rcud)— ^
25.13 currentdronsmission =  currentdransmission +  1 ;
26.16 send DAT.4GRAM
A lg o rith m  4 .28  (Algorithm C A tT P ) (Part IV
26.01 Procedure CMTPVALIDATIONCHECKS(in DATAGRAM,out error/Zog)
26.02 Check version type, message type
03 Check authentication value
04 Check message length 
06 
06
Check to recognize IDPR protocol type in header 
If  any of the checks fail set errorBag=false
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FU TU R E W ORK  
In  this thesis research, we have studied a policy routing protocol that can be used for 
communication between diSerent autonomous systems. We proposed a self-stabilizing Inter 
Domain Pohcy Routing algorithm. Our solution deals with faults such as message loss, 
message corruption, and memory corruption. Detection and recovery from faults were 
implemented using the paradigm of self-stabilization.
The path setup procedure was implemented to set up a successful path, respecting the 
transit policies. The requested services were also provided at the same time. Path failure 
and recovery were handled.
The research initiated in this thesis can be explored further. The route generation 
procedure can be improved by assigning diEerent weights to the different metrics (such as 
delay, bandwidth) and by assigning weights to the routes and selecting the best route.
The domain partitions can be taken into account. The algorithm can be made to 
continue to operate properly in the presence of partitioned autonomous systems. Changes 
in transit policies configured for an autonomous system can be accommodated. Policy 
gateways can be used to maintain standby alternate paths that can become the primar)'̂  
path if necessary. Policy gateways can be made to forward messages along a path prior to 
confirmation of successful path establishment.
66
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